

DA FAVORITA PAPER *02/2017*

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PREFACE

HANS WINKLER

Ambassador; Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

The Diplomatic Academy is one of the leading graduate schools in the world, preparing about 170 students per year from all over the world for international careers and responsible positions in government, international organisations and international business. Moreover, it is also a venue for discussion and high-ranking conferences, about 120 public events per year. Only very few of them result in publications.

In the meantime this is the third talk by Wendelin Ettmayer that leads to a publication. The two other volumes were highly successful and are out of print already. They differ from other Favorita Papers in several ways. For one thing, they are not academic anthologies of several authors, with footnotes, references etc., but rather essays. For another thing, the author – who has published several books already – is also a former Ambassador plus an alumnus of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (1967-69) and member of the DA's Hall of Fame.

The event that this publication is based on took place on 2 March 2017. Wendelin Ettmayer's keynote was followed by a discussion with Petra Schneebauer, Head of the Citizens' Help Desk in the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, and Christian Segur-Cabanac, lieutenant-general ret. and president of the Society for Politico-Strategic Studies. The event, organised by the Alumni Association of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, ClubDA, was held in German, but as our students and alumni are mainly English speaking, Wendelin Ettmayer decided to publish his lecture in English.

Therefore, I would like to thank not only Wendelin Ettmayer for his commitment, but also the Provincial Government of Upper Austria for their contribution and ClubDA and their President Oliver Kitz for making this publication possible.

PREFACE

OLIVER KITZ
President of ClubDA

Founded in 1969 by graduates from the first and second Diploma Programme of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA) as well as alumni of the DA's predecessor, the Consular Academy, ClubDA is one of the oldest Alumni Associations in Austria. Its main goals are to maintain a link between the Academy and its graduates; to support alumni and students alike; and to foster scientific cooperation, especially in the field of international relations, in Austria and abroad.

To reach these goals, ClubDA amongst others offers the following services:

- ClubDA's web portal including a contact details database for networking and a list of current job openings;
- DA LINK, the Academy's annual Career Day to which CEOs, high-ranking officials and HR managers from a broad variety of companies and organisations are invited to sit down and talk with DA's students about their career plans during what we call a "Business Speed Dating" event;
- DA News, our bi-annual newsletter;
- talks and discussions covering many different aspects related to the DA's main academic areas;
- eighteen local chapters all across Europe, in North America and Asia; as well as
- the ClubDA Scholarships programme through which we support students in financial need in order to enable them to finish their studies at the Academy.

All these activities and services are provided in close cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna's Alumni and Administrative Office.

The publication at hand is based on the keynote address Ambassador Wendelin Etmayer delivered on the occasion of ClubDA's 11th Alumni Hall of Fame Talk on "Krieg und Frieden – gestern, heute, morgen", which took place at the Diplomatic Academy on 2 March 2017.

1 Old States – New World

At the beginning of the 21st century, we find ourselves confronted with many global challenges, such as security threats, national disasters, environmental pollution, financial crises, civil wars, and human rights violations. However, there is one essential problem: nation states are no longer able to live up to these challenges and the “world state” does not yet exist. Many problems have adopted a new, international dimension, but the only instrument available to solve them is still the same old nation state. International relations are increasingly focused on the welfare of the people, but traditional power politics do still exist.

1.1 A divided world: power politics and the welfare state in international relations

When one looks at international relations at the beginning of the 21st century, the world seems divided: while some states pursue traditional foreign policies based on power politics, other countries consider the advancement of their citizens’ personal welfare the primary goal of foreign policy actions. For hundreds of years, foreign policy was the politics of power. Its goal was to maintain the sovereignty and power of the state. Being “great” from a historical point of view meant to conquer territories and expand one’s sphere of influence. The means to this end were *Realpolitik* and war; therefore, soldiers and diplomats often collaborated.

By way of contrast, welfare considerations have taken on an important role by shaping international relations for many countries. Their foreign policy goals focus on the well-being of their citizens by ensuring a high standard of living and fighting poverty, hunger, and AIDS. World population growth and the global food supply are important topics on the agenda; international conferences often address issues such as development aid, the protection of the environment, human rights, the emancipation of women, and the well-being of children. International organisations and major conferences represent the new tools to implement this new kind of foreign policy; NGOs, the media, and multinational firms are the new key players. Many international efforts today are moving in the direction of extending the model of the welfare state to an increasing number of states all over the world. As a result, the advancement of personal welfare is also becoming an important legitimisation principle in international relations. Waging war in pursuit of narrow national interests has become an inconceivable notion for Western welfare states.

After the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), inter-European relations were based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The states were not subject to any outside form of authority. National self-interest was the highest *leitmotiv*. The use of violence in pursuit of these interests was considered entirely legitimate, and foreign policy strategies were to be aligned exclusively with the interests of one’s own country.

In practice, the approach of *Realpolitik* has led to peace treaties that arbitrarily divided up territories and caused a lot of suffering and hardship for the people concerned. A balance of power was supposed to be the basis of the struggle for glory on the part of the sovereigns. Their political theory, which put national interests at the centre of

international relations, was coined by the use of mass armies and the citizens' willingness to die for one's fatherland on the "field of honour."

Nowadays, the USA are the only Western nation to take this traditional approach to foreign policy, fighting wars and making peace (almost) at will. Somalia and Ethiopia are also sovereign states in a similar sense; they too can declare war whenever they please because they are not part of the "community of states." All other countries must more or less abide by the current rules set up by the international community of states. In Europe, Canada, and Australia, foreign policy has mainly focused on "social welfare policies," yielding important results which have changed people's attitudes in a number of different ways: when Americans speak of security, be it John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, or Barack Obama, they refer to military security. In contrast, when Europeans speak of security, they mean social safety and their retirement pensions. When Americans engage in warfare, they still do it in the name of defending their national interests. Europeans, in contrast, carry out their military operations as "international peace missions" with the purpose of defending common values. In Europe, soldiers no longer serve to promote power political interests of their country. In America, the winner of an election is usually somebody who is able to make the country feel protected and strong, whereas in Austria and other European countries elections are won by whoever promotes the benefits of the welfare state.

According to the principles of the United Nations, peace and security are ensured by respecting the sovereignty and the independence of the member states; the promotion of common values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has become the basis of international peacemaking efforts. In this sense, even the concepts of a "responsibility to protect" and the "right to intervene" were developed in contrast to the principles of state sovereignty in order to ensure peace and security.

In Europe, a new type of international organisation came into being in the form of the Council of Europe, which is committed to bringing about unity through common values. In particular, citizens of the Council's member states have been granted the right to file lawsuits in the supranational European Court for Human Rights. The citizens' quest for personal welfare has thus clearly pushed the state's pursuit of power into the background.

1.2 The dialectics of globalisation

On the one hand, globalisation certainly is a uniting force: the principles of a free market economy have been accepted almost all over the world; modern technologies facilitate the exchange of information and communication, and liberal values have become almost universally appealing.

At the same time, however, the process of globalisation is also causing divisions: it can also result in strengthening nationalism, regionalism, and fundamentalism.

Since the collapse of communism, liberal values and the principles of a free market economy have spread all over the world: they proved to be more successful and to

promote people's welfare much more efficiently than dictatorships and planned economies. Democracy, the privatisation of enterprises, and the deregulation of the economy have become commonly accepted principles in many countries. Even though the democratic system has not been successfully implemented in all the countries of the world, the democratic spirit in the form of democratic reforms or protests has spread all over the world; in some places this process was successful, in others less so. New technologies, ranging from the computer to the cell phone and the iPod, have further contributed to more openness and a new form of universal connectedness. They have brought the world closer together as the markets and the media have developed their own dynamics.

In spite of its positive forces, globalisation has also strengthened some adverse developments: by being included in the global economic process, countries like China, India, Russia, and Brazil have become more powerful and more nationalistic. We are thus moving towards a multipolar world, in which international political decisions and their implementation must be based on a much broader approach.

Certain basic developments illustrate this trend: while the United States produced 60% of the world economic output in the post-war era after 1945, nowadays all the Western nations taken together yield the same number; the West's entire share of the world's economic output will shrink to 38% by 2025; and while Europe and North America accounted for 33% of the world's total population 100 years ago, those regions of the world currently only make up 17% of the global population.

But globalisation can also trigger divisive ideas and ideologies in some individuals. In the face of Western ideological imports, some people might develop the urge to go back to their roots and seek protection in a traditional, ideological or religious environment.

Consequently, even in the era of globalisation, nationalism and in particular fundamentalism have gained impetus since some people reject Western values and follow a more reactionary path. Attitudes we have long adopted in Europe, such as the separation of church and state, might meet with rejection in Islamic fundamentalist circles, as they still view religion as the basis for conducting their everyday life.

1.3 What is the international community?

Whenever a disaster strikes, human rights are violated or the need arises to restore peace in some corner of the world, much is said about the **international community**. The concept of the international community is a blend between an occasional reflection of reality and wishful thinking. In this context, three problems arise:

- It is not clear exactly who constitutes the international community;
- The international organisations that were created after World War II are outdated; and
- The United States as the leading nation of the international community often follow their own interests (e.g. on matters relating to the protection of the environment or the International Criminal Court (ICC)).

The international community offers assistance whenever a disaster strikes, be it the fight against hunger or AIDS, a crisis in Haiti, or a tsunami in Asia. The community of values has become more visible in some instances: states are making an effort to bring wrongdoers before the International Criminal Court or Special Courts for genocide and war crimes that were committed in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. However, many actions are often not only the result of certain values, but rather the result of self-interest.

In some cases, the international community has taken steps to protect peace and security from dictators, to stop civilian suffering, or to terminate civil wars. New standards have been introduced, albeit not always in a coherent way. Peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building, and nation-building have become endeavours pursued by the international community, but there is still a significant discrepancy between theory and practice.

What can be done to overcome the fact that national institutions are still the key players when it comes to solve global problems?

- The system of international organisations must be updated: since the Spanish War of Succession (Utrecht, 1713), a new international order was established after every world conflict. This was not the case after the Cold War, however; the international organisations established after the Second World War cannot live up to the new challenges anymore.
- We need new, global political guidelines to tame the economic forces of globalisation: as the welfare state has successfully used the dynamics of Manchester capitalism in order to promote the welfare of the majority of people, global governance is necessary to align the dynamics of global capitalism with the overall wellbeing of the citizens.
- We have to say farewell to long-cherished notions, such as the national economy, national security, and national interests. They no longer exist. After all, even our national soccer teams now take a multinational approach.

2 Diplomacy in the Centre of Europe: Austria 1814-1914

2.1 From Congress to War

The conduct of Austria's foreign policy before the First World War demonstrates how a bad foreign policy could transform a country from a dominant power into an isolated one. After the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), Austria was the dominant country in Europe. She dominated Central Europe; was the leading power within the German Confederation, and exercised political dominance over Italy.

Austria was a multinational state that was home to many nationalities: Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Italians. The Austrian Emperor Francis I, formed the 'Holy Alliance,' together with the Emperor (Czar) of Russia and the King of Prussia. This Alliance was managed by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich – the most preeminent statesman of his day, and one of the most distinguished diplomats in history. The goals of this Alliance were: to assure political dominance in Europe, and to suppress the main ideas of the French Revolution: democracy, equality, and self-determination of nations. The Holy Alliance intervened to suppress revolutions, and prevented 'regime changes' in conservative countries.

For more than a generation, until 1848, the Austrian Chancellor Metternich managed the system well. As far as the internal political structure was concerned, this system of absolutism was a perfect police state: absolute power was held by the Monarch; there was no representative government. The army and bureaucracy were the unifying forces within the Monarchy.

In 1848, revolutions broke first out in Paris and spread to Hungary, Northern Italy, and other places in Europe. People were revolting against oppression, invoking the principles of the French Revolution: Liberty and democracy; national independence, and the right to form a nation state.

In Austria, the revolution was suppressed in blood and defeated. The Hungarian revolution was put down with the help of the Russians at the battlefield of Világos. The Italian uprising was smashed by Field Marshal Radetzky; the uprising in Vienna was crushed by the troops of Windisch-Grätz and the Croat Baron Jelačić. The movements for liberty and national self-determination were defeated. It was a triumph of the counter-revolution. But the ideas of liberty and national unity lived on.

On 2 December 1848, Franz Joseph was crowned Austrian Emperor at the age of 18. His lesson from the defeat of the 1848 revolution was rather illusory: he assumed that ideas and ideologies could be defeated by military means. New barracks were built in Vienna and in Budapest, and filled with soldiers from Bosnia in order to prevent political protests in the future. Austria showed a repressive attitude against the unification movements in Italy and did not succeed at preserving its predominance in Germany. It was, in fact, through military defeats that Austria lost her dominant position both in Italy and Germany.

In Italy, at that time not yet a nation-state, the movement for unification was irreversible.

The driving force of this movement was the Kingdom of Piedmont with its capital Turin. Supported by France, in 1859 the province of Lombardy (Milan) defeated the Austrian troops at the decisive battle of Solferino. In Germany, the driving force for unification was the Kingdom of Prussia, under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck. In 1866, Austria was defeated at the battle of Königgrätz, and had to give up all rights to rule Germany. At the same time, Austria had to give up its last possession in Italy, the province of Venetia (Venice).

In 1871, German unity was achieved after a successful war against France. This unity was established without Austria, which had previously been the predominant power within the 'Holy Roman Empire' for centuries. The old security assumptions were fading and Europe was steadily entering a multipolar era. In the 19th century, Europe was preoccupied with the maintenance of balance of power arrangements among its five great powers: Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia.

In 1879, the 'Dual Alliance' between Austria-Hungary and the German Reich was concluded. Germany was bound to come to Austria's assistance only if Russia attacked her first. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was aware of the fact that the new German Reich was too big and too powerful on the European continent, and proper balance of power arrangements were essential for peace. For this reason Bismarck presented himself not as an all-powerful leader, but as an 'honest broker.' He bound Germany into a system of treaties in order to make the other powers feel safe.

In this spirit he concluded the 'Reassurance Treaty' with Russia, and asserted time and again that the Balkans were not worth "the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier" (an interesting parallel to what President John F. Kennedy said almost a century later about the islands Quemoy and Matsu off the Chinese coast; not being worth "the bones of a single American soldier"). Regardless, political tensions were never off the agenda in the Balkans.

In 1881, Serbia was still ruled by an Austrian-friendly dynasty, which concluded a treaty with Austria-Hungary. Under the terms of this treaty, Serbia agreed to suppress all anti-Austrian conspiracies. But eventually, in 1903, the Austria-friendly dynasty of Obrenovich was overthrown. Previously, in 1873, the 'League of the three Emperors' (Austria, Germany, and Russia) had been established with the aim of containing the Russian expansion in the Balkans. It was an unstable alliance, as Russia and Austria had conflicting interests in the Balkans. Therefore, the League eventually gave way to the 'Dual Alliance' (Austria and Germany), which in 1882 was turned into a 'Triple Alliance' by including Italy as an independent nation-state (it was important for the new Italian state to assert herself as such). On the other hand, Italy gave the assurance of neutrality in case of war between Austria and Russia. This Triple Alliance was on shaky grounds from the beginning, and it did not work that well with the outbreak of World War I.

In 1883, Austria concluded a treaty with Romania, which should, as an alliance against Russia, provide more security on the Eastern front. In addition, Romania agreed to give up the irredentist propaganda in Austria's Transylvania, where many Romanians lived. This treaty failed as well – Romania entered World War I against Austria.

Several other balance of power arrangements were also made, all in an effort to preserve peace in Europe: a 'Mediterranean Agreement' between Austria, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain was supposed to preserve the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1897, an agreement between Austria and Russia was concluded in order to 'put the Balkans on ice,' and to preserve the status quo in this region. In 1903, the 'Agreement of Mürzsteg' between the Austrian and the Russian Monarch was designed to assure the peaceful coexistence in the Balkans. However, these treaties failed to take into account one main factor: the nationalistic aspirations of Austrian (and Russian) minorities. These national aspirations proved to be stronger than all the international treaties or agreements concluded for the preservation of peace.

Very detrimental for Austria proved to be the growing isolation of Germany, on which Austria relied as only real ally. Germany got more and more isolated within Europe. After the successful war against France in 1871, Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine, an act that led to permanent hostile relations with her Western neighbour. As the 'Treaty of Reassurance' was not renewed in 1891, Russia was alienated as well, and Japan was concerned with the drive of German expansion in the Pacific.

German behaviour was puzzling and incomprehensible: an offer of alliance made by Great Britain was declined. Even worse, the Imperial Reich started a costly naval competition with Britain that could never be won. Whereas Bismarck presented himself as an 'honest broker', the German Kaiser Wilhelm II talked of 'Weltherrschaft' (ruling the world). The buildup of the German navy could in no way threaten the English sea dominance, but it had a terrible effect of mobilising the British establishment against Germany. During World War I, the German navy played no significant role, and ironically in 1918, the German Revolution against the German Kaiser was started by German sailors.

As Germany alienated the other European powers, alliances and 'understandings' (*Entente*) among other European powers developed. In 1891, a first military alliance between France and Russia was concluded – French financial institutions were heavily involved in Russia. In 1898, France and England settled their colonial disputes after the Fashoda conflict was successfully avoided. In 1904, the 'Entente cordiale' was concluded between France and Great Britain, and it became the basis for a future alliance. In 1907, an agreement between Great Britain and Russia over Persia led to an 'Entente' between those two countries.

What did Austria do? It followed Germany into isolation. The 'Dual Alliance' concluded with Germany in 1879 was inflated by official propaganda to mythical dimensions: it was dubbed an 'Alliance of *Nibelungentreue*' (total loyalty), evoking sentiments of a German-Austrian unity. Meanwhile, national minorities in Austria were looking for solutions of their own: Italy wanted to incorporate the Italian speaking territories of Austria. The Romanians of Transylvania were looking towards Romania. The Slavs in Bohemia and the southern parts of the Monarchy were fascinated by Pan-Slavism, which was inspired by Russia. Parts of the German-speaking population were looking to the German Reich and developed pan-Germanic tendencies.

One final fatal act by Austria-Hungary was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. Bosnia-Herzegovina had been occupied since 1878; now the leadership in Vienna wanted to demonstrate strength in order to annex that province. But this act led to enormous tensions with Russia and alienated France and Great Britain. The Austrian Foreign Minister Aehrenthal was especially keen to demonstrate strength and determination, but achieved exactly the opposite. Serbia was not intimidated, and the other European powers adopted hostile attitudes.

2.2 From Greatness to Decline and Dissolution

For Austria, World War I was already lost when it was started. On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo in Bosnia. Vienna concluded that the perpetrators were supported by Serbia. The Austrian ultimatum handed over to Serbia was formulated in such a way Serbia could not accept it. Leading circles in Austria wanted 'to take an action' and punish Serbia. They were convinced that Serbia's destruction would deflate slave nationalism and strengthen the Empire. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the Russian Empire declared war on Austria, the German Empire declared war on Russia, the French Republic declared war on Germany, and the British Empire supported its French ally and did likewise. Later Italy, and most crucially the United States joined the so-called Triple Entente of Russia, France, and Britain. The so-called Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary were outgunned:

	UK/US/France	Germany/Austria-Hungary
Share of world-wide manufactured goods (1913)	51.7	19.2
Energy consumption (million metric tons)	799	236
Steel production (million tons)	44.1	20.2
Total industrial production (UK (1900) = 100)	473	178

The war expenditures and the forces mobilised by the two opposing camps show the same imbalance (according to Paul Kenney in Rise and Fall of Great Powers):

	Billions, in today's US dollars	Mobilised Forces
Total Allies	116.8	40.7
British Empire	35.3	9.5
France	24.2	8.2
Russia	22.3	13.0
Italy	12.4	5.6
USA	22.6	3.8
Total Central Powers	60.5	25.1
Germany	37.7	13.2
Austria-Hungary	20.6	9.0
Bulgaria, Turkey	2.2	2.85

As it was indicated in Part 1, Austrian foreign policy was primarily guided and influenced by internal developments. External affairs certainly remained the *domaine réservé* for the Monarch; but he had to take into consideration the internal situation of the Monarchy, especially as far as the ethnic minorities were concerned. To a large extent, the failures of Austria's foreign policy were linked to the deadlock of domestic reforms of political institutions.

During the period between 1814 and 1848, Austria was an absolute monarchy, and people were excluded from government. The main forces of unification within the Monarchy were the person of the Emperor, the army, the bureaucracy, and the Catholic Church. The ideas spread by the French Revolution were suppressed, not only in Austria, but throughout Europe, and Metternich considered himself as the guarantor of the status quo in Europe. Aspirations for more civil liberties, such as expressed by student movements, met strong resistance.

In 1866, the Austrian army suffered a decisive defeat at the battlefield of Königgrätz against Prussia. After that military defeat the Emperor and the ruling circles of Vienna had to make political concessions. A 'compromise treaty' (*Ausgleich*) with Hungary was concluded. Hungary was granted home-rule and only defense, foreign policy, and the currency remained within the overall competence of the Monarchy, which from then on became Austro-Hungary.

This 'compromise' just normalised the relations with Hungary, but was not able to bring a general solution to other problems within the Monarchy. It was certainly a deficiency that the Hungarians interpreted the text of the 'compromise' in a different way from the Austrian side, but the Hungarians made one crucial mistake: they did not grant those same rights to the minorities on their own territory.

Internally the Austro-Hungarian Empire was beset with structural problems. The civil service worked quite well, the judiciary could guarantee fundamental rights, but it was not possible to develop functioning democratic institutions. A national parliament was established, but it was neglected from the beginning. It was symptomatic for the

parliamentary process that the Emperor Franz Joseph never really recognised its legislative powers, and never entered the parliamentary building during his whole life. He remained convinced that his legitimacy derived from the grace of God, and not from the power of the people.

The conflict over the rights of various nationalities within the Empire paralysed the Parliament; essential state problems could not be resolved. Over the years the political system failed: the Parliament did not convene and the governments changed every few months. New social classes, like the bourgeoisie and the working class became more important, they established new political parties like the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, but they did not develop into a unifying force for the Monarchy.

Overall, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire the dividing force of nationalism prevailed over the potentially unifying forces of class or group interests. The political institutions were usually either inactive or quite often destructive. In the end, the international crisis of summer 1914 had to be faced by political institutions that did not work and by a government that did not represent the people. A general suffrage for males was introduced in 1907, an early date compared to other European countries, but it could not prevent the decline of parliamentarism in the country.

The 19th century was an age of ideologies. New ideas and ideologies developed all over and influenced political processes. From central European romanticism emerged nationalism that became a dominant force in European politics. Nationalism brought about militaristic policies, and positive attitudes towards war. Linked to those new movements and new ways of thinking was, on the other hand, a traditional concept of honour, a fact that proved especially detrimental when the Great War broke out in August of 1914.

Instead of becoming a unifying national force like in most other European states, nationalism became a dividing force within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: the Monarchy was a supra-national state, which was a home to many nationalities: Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Bosnians, Slovenians, Ruthenians, Italians, Poles and others. One of the essential goals of nationalism from the very beginning has been the principle of self-determination, with the ultimate goal of creating own states for every national minority.

The roots of nationalism lay in the French Revolution which proclaimed the rights of the people. In the fights against Napoleonic domination, especially in Germany feelings of national identity and romanticism arose. Another root came from the discovery and development of one's own language: some groups within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, like Czechs, Slovaks or Croats started to read and write in their own language only in the 19th century. Romanticism, the discovery of ancient mystic poems and the development of a national art, literature and music inspired national feelings. An example: Giuseppe Verdi's operas, such as *Nabucco* or *Macbeth*, not only dealt with historic subjects, but were clearly directed against Austrian occupation of parts of Italy.

Nationalistic ideas found a special expression in the pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements aimed at unifying all Germans and all Slavic nations respectively. This later

movement was very influential in the Balkans and was supported by Russians. In addition, extremists and radical groups became active, which further contributed to the paralysis of the Austrian political system.

After the Napoleonic wars until the outbreak of the Great War, Europe was relatively peaceful and, for a century, did not witness a general war. However, all over Europe not only generals but also politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals thought in militaristic terms. War was generally associated with a short military conflict, such as the Austro-Prussian war mentioned above or the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. These wars did not last more than a few months and the boys were always home for Christmas. The logic of war was dominant in European societies, and by 1914 most people were convinced that a European war was inevitable and that it would be a short conflict that would solve most of the problems.

In central European states, the army was considered as the foundation of the state; all other state institutions had to be subordinated to it. As Serbia kept the idea of a south Slav national unity alive, the military circles in Austria were convinced that Serbia had to be dealt with sooner or later. Especially the Austrian Chief of Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, was pushing towards a preventive war with Serbia. He believed that a victorious war would slow down the centrifugal forces of nationalism within the Empire. The honour of the Monarchy and the honour of the individual citizen were linked with the army and war. The status of a country as a great power was directly linked to its military power. It was widely considered an honour to die on the battlefield.

At the same time, the Austrian army was weak. It lost its war of 1859 against Italy and France at Solferino, lost the decisive battle of Königgrätz in 1866, and as the events of the Great War showed, it did not even succeed against Serbia. Although splendidly uniformed, the Austro-Hungarian armed forces were badly equipped and under-financed. Technologically backward, they had to be bailed out by German forces on all fronts during the Great War.

When war came in 1914, the mobilisation order to the Austro-Hungarian army was issued in 15 different languages. Allocations to the Austrian army were between one third and half of the financial resources of the Russian and Prussian armed forces. In 1914, one-third of the 900,000 soldiers deployed died or were wounded during the first four weeks of combat (out of a population of 50 million). Due to a lack of financial resources, only one third of the available manpower was conscripted.

The concept of honour embraced by the elites at the beginning of World War I was rooted in ancient times, and paralleled the honour code of medieval knights. The great Austrian economist Schumpeter subsequently attributed the outbreak of World War I to irrational and pre-capitalist desires for self-glorification and violent self-assertion, prevalent among the aristocracy.

The imperialism practiced by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was also certainly linked with feudal values – the military honour code still drew a parallel between a personal insult and a national humiliation. The Emperor Franz Joseph was definitely a typical example for this attitude. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand he demanded

satisfaction and said: “If we must go under, we better go under decently.” Prestige and honour were important contributing causes of the war against Serbia, which triggered the Great War – after all, the world in 1914 was based on honour. Many industrialists and business people, like Walther Rathenau (CEO of the powerful AEG enterprise) preferred trade to war. Others warned that war was a response grounded in fear. But those voices could not overcome the attitudes of vanity and megalomania. In the Austro-Hungarian society, the rank in the military or in the bureaucracy was definitely more important than money. The thinking of the Austrian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, about war had as much to do with honour as with security. And Emperor Franz Joseph certainly felt humiliated by the defeats of “his” army at Solferino and Königgrätz. He resented the declining prestige of his army.

The decline of Austria from the dominant power in Europe in 1814 to its dissolution 100 years later could be attributed to few specific developments. The forces of history prevailed over ancient modes of thinking and once great power was swept away.

3 World War I: Why did European Diplomacy Fail – Could it Happen Today?

To answer those two questions right away:

European diplomacy failed because foreign ministers and diplomats embraced a logic of war.

Yes it could happen today, but not in Europe; maybe in other parts of the world.

So let's first answer the question of what war meant for European diplomacy in 1914.

3.1 What did war mean for European diplomacy?

International relations were dominated by a logic of war; war was seen as part of history, considered as inevitable; the soldier and diplomats acted together in shaping international relations. Open questions were decided by negotiations or through war. In 1914 foreign ministers and diplomats in the countries concerned relied on war.

The French Revolution was essential as far as the attitude of the people towards war was concerned: before the French Revolution, war was considered as the "game of the kings." One of the major results of the French Revolution was the transfer of sovereignty from the king to the nation, to the peoples. In the same way, as the army became a people's army; the wars became national wars. In the age of nationalism war became a national endeavour, or as Chris Hedges saw it, "war is the force that gives us meaning."

Not only politicians and the military saw it that way, it was also the attitude expressed by artists and writers, as Geert Buelens wrote in his book "Europas Dichter und der Erste Weltkrieg". The Italian artistic movement called the 'futurists' is a typical example. They considered war as the "sole hygienic solution in the world". The army should educate the nation. It was only logical that the futurists considered personal liberty as subordinated to the well-being of the nation. A similar philosophy was expressed by Ford Madox Hueffer, who was convinced that England must be a world power or parish. His countryman Rudyard Kipling and Siegfried Sassoon expressed the same opinion. Representatives of such nationalistic attitudes in France were Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras and Charles Péguy.

Even the churches did not hesitate to stand up in favour of war. In this sense the catholic Cardinal of Vienna Friedrich Gustav Piffl instructed the Austrian catholics in a pastoral letter that Austria was entering "a just war in 1914" and in many churches the Lord's Prayer was concluded by "protect Austria and punish England."

The concept of honour embraced by elites at the beginning of World War I was rooted in ancient times, still very similar to the honour code of medieval knights, even of ancient heroes. The great Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, subsequently attributed the outbreak of World War I to irrational and pre-capitalist desires for self-glorification and violent self-assertion, prevalent among the aristocracy.

The military code of honour still drew a parallel between a personal insult and international humiliation. Emperor Franz Joseph was a typical example of this attitude. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, he demanded satisfaction and said: "If we must go under, we better go under decently." Similar attitudes dominated the thinking in other countries: When the British suffered 60,000 casualties at the battle of Ypres, the acting Commander wrote in his diary: "What a glorious day in the history of our country."

Three wars were an essential part of German unification:

- The war fought by Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864;
- The war fought between Prussia and Austria in 1866 decided by the battle of Königgrätz;
- The war between Prussia and France in 1870/71, which ended with the proclamation of the German Empire in Paris.

Italian unification was also linked to war:

- The battle of Magenta and Solferino were fought in 1859 by Austria on one side and Italy and France on the other;
- After the battles of Magenta and Lissa in 1866, Austria lost the province of Venetia to Italy.

During the same period other wars took place as well:

- The war between the USA and Spain in 1898;
- The Boer war in South Africa with the British;
- The war between Japan and Russia in 1904-05.

In addition, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by wars:

- The Italian war in Libya in 1911;
- The first Balkan war in 1912;
- The second Balkan war in 1913.

These local wars were rather short and decisive.

3.2 The concept of security and power was based on military strength

Security was considered in military terms; power was calculated according to the number of soldiers, battleships and the size of the territory. In some cases this way of thinking was dramatically counter-productive:

- After 1900, the German Reich started a costly naval competition with Britain that could never be won. British naval spending was three times the German figure in 1904, and still more than twice as much in 1913. Whereas Bismarck presented himself as an 'honest broker', the German Kaiser Wilhelm II talked of 'Weltherrschaft'. The build-up of the German Navy could in no way threaten

British sea-dominance, but it had the terrible effect of mobilising the British establishment against Germany.

- The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Austria-Hungary had a similar negative effect. The driving force behind this action was the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal. He thought that Austria could intimidate the Serbian minority within the country and impress Serbia and the other powers by changing the existing status of occupation (since the congress of Berlin) by extending Austrian sovereignty to Bosnia and Herzegovina by force.

The result was devastating for Austria: This action led to an outburst of national enthusiasm in Serbia; the strengthening of pro-Serbian networks within Bosnia and Herzegovina and most of all to the alienation of great powers.

3.3 International relations based on the logic of war led to the formation of military alliances

In 1879 the 'Dual Alliance' between Austria-Hungary and the German Reich was concluded. Germany was bound to come to Austria's assistance if Russia attacked her first. In 1882 this alliance was turned in to a 'Triple Alliance' by including Italy.

In 1894 a military alliance between France and Russia was concluded. Why did Russia take this step?

Britain was Russia's rival in the Far East and in Central Asia; and there were signs of a rapprochement between Great Britain and Germany. France's financial institutions heavily supported the construction of a modern infrastructure in Russia; and the French wanted to contain Germany. The Russians, on the other hand, wanted to block Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.

In 1904 the Entente between France and Britain was formed, which was extended in 1907 by including Russia. An Entente is not a military alliance as such, but the basis for closer cooperation.

To what extent did those alliances contribute to the outbreak of World War I?

It is a characteristic of an alliance that a local conflict can turn into a continental war. As the two systems of alliances confronted one another in 1914, the imbalance concerning military strength was clear from the beginning: according to Paul Kennedy, the war expenditures of the British Empire, France and Russia amounted to 81.8 billion US dollars; this alliance could mobilise 30.7 million forces. On the other hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary raised 58.3 million US dollars for the war effort and could 'only' mobilise 22.2 million forces.

3.4 Every country had its own reason for why it wanted to go to war and its own group pushing it in that direction

Austria-Hungary wanted to punish Serbia and re-assert herself as a great power after a victorious war. Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf had been in favour of preventive wars against Serbia and Italy for years. The German Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke was convinced that Russia would get stronger and stronger in the years to come. For this reason Germany had to start a war as long as it still had a chance to fight on two fronts: The Schlieffen-Plan was developed.

In 1914, the Russian army was twice as big as that of Germany, amounting to 1.5 million men, which was more than 300,000 troops larger than the Austrian and German armies together. The Russian figure was to exceed 2 million troops by 1917.

In Russia, the War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov tried to prevent the infiltration of “civilian attitudes” into military decision making. In 1912 he had already expressed the view that “war was inevitable”, and that war would bring Russia “nothing but good”, as Christopher Clark wrote in his excellent book, “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914”.

In France, taking revenge for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 was a driving force in foreign policy. In 1912, Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré adopted a pro-military attitude; the Chief of the General Staff Joseph Joffre advocated a preemptive strike against Germany through Belgian territory.

And in Italy, the Futurists announced in their famous manifesto in 1909: "We will glorify war – the world’s only hygiene." And Giovanni Papini, an essayist, writes: “We must love war with all our male hearts.”

In May 1914, Colonel Edward House, the special advisor of the U.S.President, reported to President Wilson: “Militarism run stark mad in Europe”.

There was a cult of military display; a strong belief that war would be the final solution.

Maybe the decision-makers in those days were not fully aware of what war really meant; but they were active in preparing it, they embraced a logic of war, they were not "Sleepwalkers."

3.5 Why did European diplomacy fail?

The outbreak of World War I must be considered as a failure for European diplomacy, as diplomacy is the business of peace. This failure can be attributed to three courses:

- Personal failure of leading players responsible for foreign policy and diplomacy.
- Ideologies mobilised whole nations, pushed diplomacy towards radical goals and made it less flexible. Nations were totally mobilised to wage total war, which

could only be won by a total victory. There was no possibility left for compromise.

- There were new forces that influenced decision-making in diplomacy like the media and public opinion.

3.6 Leading personalities in diplomacy embraced a logic of war

The mindset was formed by the “world of yesterday”, as Stefan Zweig said. Policies were oriented towards confrontation, the disastrous effects of modern warfare were not taken into account.

The German Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, the Russian Czar, all cousins, regarded themselves as “Rulers by the grace of God”. They disregarded the suffering of the people. This was certainly one of the reasons why their dynasties were overthrown by the end of the war.

Emperor Franz Joseph was 84 years old and had reigned for 66 years when he signed the declaration of war on 28 July 1914 in his summer resort in Bad Ischl. During the July-Crisis, when the bureaucracy in Vienna discussed what steps to take against Serbia, Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Berchtold always had to take a seven-hour train ride to Bad Ischl to report to the Emperor, who was not willing to use a telephone. Berchtold's main endeavour in those days was a formulation for the ultimatum the Serbs could not accept.

The German Kaiser Wilhelm II, the grandson of Queen Victoria, was erratic and eccentric. At one time threatening the whole world, another time proclaiming his friendship and peaceful intention towards Britain, but time and again, he was responsible for diplomatic plunder.

In Vienna as in Berlin, since the overthrow of Metternich and the resignation of Bismarck during the decades before World War I, not one single statesman emerged: Wilhelm II and Franz Joseph were surrounded by devoted bureaucrats, to whom they also entrusted the running of the government (according to the excellent description by Anton Mayr-Harting in his book "Der Untergang").

There were diplomats on all sides and on all levels who made their contribution to preparing the war:

- The French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, hated Germany so much that he did not want to step on German soil when his train once stopped in Berlin on his way to St. Petersburg.
- The Russian Foreign Minister and then Ambassador to Paris, Alexander Izvolsky, had similar feelings towards Austria-Hungary.
- The Russian envoy in Belgrade, Nikolai Hartwig, used his strong political influence in the Serbian capital to mobilise against Austria.

- The British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, had already informed the German Ambassador in London in 1912 that in the event of war between Germany and the Franco-Russian alliance, Britain was likely to fight on the side of Germany's enemies.

Apparently diplomats on all sides embraced a logic of war.

Nationalism, Pan-Slavism and the idea of revenge in France had moved diplomacy from an activity behind closed doors into the public eye.

- The roots of nationalism lay in the French revolution, which proclaimed the rights of the people. In Central Europe, romanticism glorified national history. In the fight against Napoleonic domination, especially in Germany, feelings of national identity and romanticism arose. Another root for nationalism came from the discovery and development of one's own language. Nationalistic ideas found a special expression in foreign policy in the way that one's own country was considered as superior and supposed to occupy a powerful place in the concert of nations.
- Pan-Slavism is a special expression for nationalism among Slavic nations. Language, literature, tradition and history should unite Slavic people under Russian leadership, especially in the Balkans. These ideas were first oriented against the Ottoman Empire, then again Austria-Hungary, where half of the population was of Slavic origin. The book "Russia and Europe" (1869) by Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky had a great influence on the Czech, Serbian, and Bulgarian intelligentsia.

Austria-Hungary was in a special way affected by Pan-Slavism: The Slavs within the monarchy were striving for more autonomy and closer links to other Slavic brethren. Serbia wanted to include the Serbs living in Austria in a "Greater Serbia"; and Russia was the political and spiritual power behind those movements.

- When France not only lost the war against Germany in 1871, but also the provinces Alsace and Lorraine, the idea for revenge became a driving force of French foreign policy. After that war, France had not only lost the status as a pre-eminent power, but also its prestige and grandeur. Under the motto "Never talk about it, but always think about it", the French wanted to take revenge against Germany and concluded the *entente cordiale* with Britain and a military alliance with Russia. In doing this, France succeeded in encircling and isolating Germany.

That was one main reason, why World War I was so devastating:

19th century ideologies were the driving force in going to war, where the soldiers were confronted with 20th century weapons.

3.7 Press and public opinion

A third phenomenon that influenced diplomacy before World War I was the press and public opinion, new factors in decision making. A populist movement in France wanted revenge for the lost war of 1871. Public opinion in other countries contributed to the escalation of the conflict and made compromise almost impossible. Decision-makers influenced public opinion and were driven by it, whereas in former times foreign policy was the *domaine réservé* of the monarchy. Press wars were already a prelude to real wars and domestic interest determined foreign policy decisions.

Answering the question why European diplomacy failed in 1914, one can see the war-oriented attitude of leading personalities; the new ideologies led to aggressive policies and a powerful public opinion, which rendered diplomatic solutions almost impossible.

3.8 Can it happen again?

As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, one basic question must be asked: Can 1914 be repeated?

Every day we hear about wars being waged in regions from Central Africa to Central Asia. But this is only part of the picture. Basic thinking about international relations has changed dramatically in a century. While some nations still practice *realpolitik*, for many governments the personal well-being of the citizen is now the foundation of foreign policy. In Europe, we had a revolution in foreign affairs that replaced power politics with welfare thinking; a logic of war with a logic of values; a foreign policy based on the power of the state to serve the citizen.

After the terrible suffering from both world wars, the drive to build a welfare state, pioneered in Europe, is now the basis for legitimacy in international relations. While sovereignty remains important in relations between nations, ensuring the personal welfare of the individual citizen is the primary goal. The venues for this welfare-oriented foreign policy include international conferences, involving new classes of players, stakeholders like NGOs, the media and multinational companies. This has led to the globalisation of the concept of human security and pushed a new social model onto the world stage.

The United Nations best embodies this transformation, with its special mandates in development, trade, the environment and the welfare of children. And since 1949 the Council of Europe has worked to help build a new international order: For the first time in history, citizens of the Council's member states were granted the legal basis for pursuing their rights before an international body, the European Court of Human Rights. This is perhaps the most striking example of how the welfare of the citizen has superseded the power of the state.

War, in this context, has been rendered unthinkable to Europeans. For most of us in the West, when we discuss security, we are talking about social security and pension funds. While America may take an independent, traditional view on security issues, and go to

war to defend its national interests, Europeans participate in military operations as international peacekeepers, where the mission of the soldier is not about his country's foreign policy. American elections are won or lost by the promise to "make America strong again"; in Austria and other European countries, elections are won by those who promise to develop the welfare state even further.

To be sure, with the United States as the only remaining superpower able to conduct its foreign policy in the classical sense, waging war and concluding peace at its discretion, power politics has not disappeared. Arms spending, the international weapons trade and the various current wars suggest that many countries remain determined to follow the realpolitik course to national glory. We therefore live in a very divided world.

Many countries still wage war at will. But many others live in a post-Westphalian world, dominated by the aspirations of millions to improve their daily lives. For these citizens, going to war again like in 1914 is simply not possible.

3.9 The war's long lasting legacy

The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai, was once asked what he thought about the French revolution, almost 200 years after its outbreak. His answer: "It is too early to tell".

100 years after the outbreak of World War I, we can say that there are some immediate impacts and some long lasting effects:

- The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia took place in 1917; later on, the Soviet Union dominated half of Europe until 1991 and supported world revolution.
- Three dynasties were overthrown: the Habsburgs; the Hohenzollern (together with two dozen other German dynasties) and the Romanovs.
- Three Empires were destroyed: the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian Empire.
- World War II can be considered as a direct result of World War I, as it was not possible to establish a real peace after 1918. During the peace conferences, John Maynard Keynes had already noted: "The Peace Treaties were not wise; could not be implemented and were a danger to Europe." He already foresaw the next World War.

3.10 Geopolitical effects

For centuries, the Holy Roman Empire and the Austrian Monarchy had been essential players in the concert of Europe. They were an essential part of the balance of power; and as in the case of Austria, defended against invasions from the east.

After the 'Great War', Germany was weakened so much that it could not be considered a player any more. The Germans felt humiliated and absolutely did not accept the clause

in the Treaty of Versailles, which stipulated that only Germany was responsible for the outbreak of World War I. In Germany, there was a wide-spread consensus on that question and the opposition against it helped radical forces to gain legitimacy and votes.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was replaced by independent states which were often internally unstable for the years to come. The wars in the Balkans in the 1990's showed that the region was still not settled.

3.10.1 The decline of Europe

Another geopolitical effect of World War I was the decline of Europe. Britain and France were certainly victorious powers. Britain replaced the Ottoman Empire in the Near East; the land route to India was established, and the Indian Ocean became a British Ocean. But whereas Britain was the banker of the world in 1914, it then had difficulties to pay its war debts. Economically, Britain did not regain its 1913-levels until 1929, and then came the Great Depression. The financial power had moved from London to Wall Street; the U.S. Navy already outnumbered the British and the Dominions obtained the right to a separate foreign policy.

In 1920, the Soviets organised a congress of the oppressed people "to support movement against the European colonial powers." "When the colonies rise, Europe will crumble" announced Grigori Zinoviev, the President of the Comintern.

France was the second victorious power; she got back Alsace and Lorraine; tried to play the dominant force on the continent for some time and was entrusted the trusteeship over Syria, Lebanon and Cameroon. But that could not prevent the steady deterioration of the internal situation in France. In 1940, German tanks were able to crush the French army in six weeks.

With the victorious powers exhausted and the centre of Europe destroyed, the continent could never regain the role it played before 1914.

3.10.2 Geopolitical development outside of Europe

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire transformed the Middle East and mandated territories were created. In 1917, "a national home" was promised to the Jewish people. But as David Gilmour wrote, "Peace could never be found in that region: France and Britain liked to boast of their administrative skills as colonizers, but French policy in Lebanon led to predictable conflict and eventually to a ferocious civil war, while British policy in Palestine introduced a bloody antagonism that was showing few signs of abating nearly a century later."

The rise of the USA became a dominant factor in international relations for years to come: The USA became the most powerful nation on the planet. The US Navy construction already amounted to 3 million GRT in 1918, compared to 1.3 million GRT for Great Britain. Already in those days, the USA had the power to intervene in every corner of the earth. Besides that, the American President Wilson strongly influenced the concept of a future world order.

In addition, Japan was included as a player in international relations.

3.10.3 Effects concerning internal developments in different states

a. War is seen in a different way

During World War I, 4100 soldiers were killed every day; terrible atrocities were committed. That meant a 9/11 on a daily basis. The failure of the ruling elites led to a total break-down of the value system people believed in. For the great majority of people affected by the war, life had just become unbearable. The millions affected by the war saw future confrontations with much less enthusiasm than they demonstrated in August 1914.

b. The radicalization of political life

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, Germany suffered such a terrible inflation that on some days the exchange rate between one USD and one German Mark was one to one billion. A main consequence of the Great Depression was terrible unemployment. Trust in government and authority before the war was replaced by hatred. The economic and social impact on an impoverished society was detrimental and resulted in a physiological impact: a total radicalisation of political life. Extremist political parties took over, all over Europe: the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917; the Fascists in Italy in 1922, Hitler and the Nazis in Germany in 1933. The Great War, of which the aim was “to bring democracy to Europe” (President Wilson), brought dictatorships from Estonia to Spain and domestic events more and more determined international relations.

3.10.4 Efforts concerning a future peaceful international order: A League of Nations was created

Point 14 of the 14 Points of President Wilson stipulated: An association of nations should be established in order to guarantee political independence and territorial integrity. The covenant of the League of Nations became part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The declared goals were: a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the future to prevent wars and to achieve disarmament.

This system did not work: too many did not participate, especially the USA, or were excluded or withdrew. The League was too weak to resist the impact of aggression created by domestic radicalism. The big powers did not give up the “logic of war” on which their foreign policy was based.

A new kind of technical cooperation was developed after World War I. An International Labour Organization was established, which would survey international labour standards. An agreement on civil aviation was concluded and the International Postal and Telegraph Union was set up.

They were forerunners for all those international organisations which, after World War II, aimed to improve the well-being of the people within the frame of the United Nations. Despite the fact that it was not possible to establish a peaceful order after World War I,

the first step concerning a new dimension of international relations, concerning the well-being of the people, was taken.

Part of this new dimension was the tendency to ban war as an instrument of international policy: The Locarno Treaty (1925) should have guaranteed the Western-German border with France and Belgium and included Arbitration Treaties. The Briand-Kellogg-Pact (1928) did renounce wars as an instrument of national policy and the Convention of London (1933) took an effort to define aggression.

Which of all those initiatives have succeeded – is it too soon to tell?

4 Power Politics and Welfare Thinking in International Relations¹

4.1 Traditional Power Politics

For thousand years foreign policy was mostly power politics: great powers wanted to dominate the weaker ones, emerging countries tried to establish a new balance of power, international relations were characterised by struggles for existence between states.

The competition among great powers was the main subject of books dealing with international relations. To cite only a few examples: Wolfgang Windelband published his book about “*The Foreign Policy of the Great Powers from 1494-1919*” in 1922 with the following chapters:

- The preliminary battles for predominance in Italy (1494-1519)
- The fight against the predominance of Spain (1519-1659)
- The fight against the predominance of France (1659-1815)
- England dominating the world (1815-1919)

Paul Kennedy published his best-seller “*The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*” in 1988 and put the following events at the centre of his theory:

- The Habsburg Bid for Mastery (1519-1659)
- Finance, Geography, and the Winning of Wars (1660-1815)
- Industrialisation and the Shifting Global Balances (1815-1885)
- The Coming of a Bipolar World and the Crisis of the ‘Middle-Powers’ (1885-1918; 1919-1942)
- Stability and Change in a Bipolar World (1943-1980)

The literature about international relations was dominated by one subject, and that was power politics.

Even today, many history books are written the same way: Brendan Simms’s book “*Europe: The struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present*” places the theme of ‘power’ in the middle of his account. The first chapter of the book, entitled “Empires,” begins in 1453. In that year, the conquest of Constantinople brought the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, and the English had to abandon their empire in France. Simms goes on to describe the power politics of Charles V., Louis XIV., Napoleon and many other rulers until today.

Ulrich Menzel from the Technische Universität Braunschweig published “*Die Ordnung der Welt*” in 2015. Among the predominate states he distinguishes between empires and hegemons. He sought to demonstrate if a country was a hegemonic power or just an empire. Going back to the Song-Dynasty in China (960-1204) and Pax Mongolica (1230-1350) he asks if today the United States should be portrayed as a hegemonic power or an empire.

¹ This chapter was edited by Melissa Jane Taylor, Ph.D.

That shows that even today, foreign policy and history are almost exclusively presented as traditional power politics with traditional goals, traditional means, and traditional players.

The traditional **goals** of foreign policy were to safeguard the sovereignty of the state and to increase the power of the ruler. This was also its basic legitimacy. According to the teachings of Jean Bodin (†1596), the ruler was the sovereign. He was entitled to exert his power in his own discretion, towards his subjects, any other individuals and nations as well. The endeavour of the state to become more powerful was an essential element of the theory and the practice of international relations.

The traditional **means** of foreign policy were *realpolitik*, *raison d'État*, and war. *Realpolitik* meant the reversal of values in the field of international relations. Behaviour, that in the private realm would be most strongly condemned, would be the highest honour if it served the power of the state: destroying, killing, plundering and waging war.

As the great philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte put it: in dealing with other states there is no law that could hinder any action taken by our sovereign. The one in power is always right.

According to this way of thinking, deals among the monarchs were made without taking into consideration the needs of the people. Provinces and countries, like Poland, were divided and even disappeared from the map, according to the decisions of the Great Powers. The soldier and the diplomat acted jointly: after wars followed peace conferences. As soon as one questioned the newly established order, new wars could ensue.

An almost permanent series of wars was the consequence, if we only look at the 'seven world wars' from the Spanish War of Succession to the Cold War.

The traditional **players** were the monarchs: they considered themselves rulers by the grace of God. They demanded obedience for the sake of their dynasties; their rule quite often was based on censorship and suppression.

4.2 Welfare Thinking in International Relations

a. What does that mean?

Even if power politics is still an essential part of today's international relations, a new dimension has developed, occupying an important place within the relations among nations: policies oriented towards an improvement in the standard of living of the people, increasing their welfare and their well-being; insuring human security and human development.

In some regions, like in Europe, those policies have become more important than the

traditional endeavour to increase the power of the state. The promotion of the well-being of the people has become an essential part of foreign policy legitimacy. In this respect foreign policy is primarily not oriented anymore towards the interest of the state, but towards the well-being of its citizens.

This development has become very evident beginning one generation ago: the sudden implosion of the communist system in Eastern Europe in the years 1989-1991 was in large part due to the fact that the standard of living was much higher in the West than in the communist East. The western way of life was much more attractive, especially for the young people: a 'cultural revolution' had taken place in the West, not in the East.

The revolution in information and technology made it easier not only to communicate with one another, but also to compare the different economic and social systems. This comparison showed very clearly that the communists had no chance. The predictions of the party chairman Khrushchev in the early 1960s that the communist economies would overtake the West, utterly failed.

b. Three examples for welfare thinking in International Relations

- The new diplomatic order in Europe
- The UN-System
- Globalisation

4.3 The new diplomatic order in Europe

During the last two generations, since the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949, a revolution has taken place in European diplomacy, which has led to drastic changes regarding the goals, the means, and the participants in foreign policy among European states. Those changes also had major repercussions concerning the understanding of power and security.

As far as the **goals** are concerned, it is no longer the aim of foreign policy of a European country to increase the power of the state, but to support the welfare of the people. Foreign policy is now oriented towards the citizen, not the state. Connecting people has become a preeminent task of European diplomats.

The **means** of foreign policy are no longer *Realpolitik* and war. The founding members of the Council of Europe replaced power politics with common values like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Those values determine not only the internal structure of European states, but also the relations among themselves. Within the Council of Europe and within the European Union, confrontation was replaced by cooperation. The fields of cooperation include human rights, as well as the protection of the environment, education and employment policies, economic development, and security questions. Most internal political issues became international issues as well.

Traditional security was based on the sovereignty of the state and non-interference from the outside. The UN Charter of 1945 and the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 still include

those principles. Today, contrary to the principles of power politics, interference in internal affairs takes place concerning the monitoring and implementation of all treaties, regulations and directives concluded by the members of the Council of Europe and the EU.

Welfare thinking has replaced warfare. The logic of war was replaced by the logic of values and wellbeing.

There is no doubt that the EU has to face some grave difficulties concerning, for example, the Euro or migration. The fundamental reason for those difficulties lies certainly in the fact of 'divided sovereignty': the members of the EU abandoned national sovereignty, but the step towards European sovereignty was not taken. Member states gave up their national currency or their border control, but they were not able to create a common economic policy or a common policy for refugees and migrants.

In addition, European aspirations quite often do not correspond to reality: CFSP should stand for common foreign and security policy, which in reality does not exist. CFSP never achieved more than a kind of crisis management. But in spite of all those difficulties, the EU has opened a new area of international relations, as improving living standards has become more important than traditional power politics.

4.4 The United Nations system

The UN was founded after World War II, but the preliminary work was already done in the early 1940s and heavily influenced by the social and political development in the United States in the decade before: primarily by the New Deal. The UN established new foreign policy goals, which were oriented towards the well-being of the people. The improvement in economic and social conditions, and the promotion of human rights became an essential part of international relations. As Franz Schurmann put it, "the UN should provide security that would protect mankind not only from major wars but also from economic collapse."

Thereby a new area of international relations was established. Economic and social questions like development and human rights became part of foreign power legitimacy. Franz Schurmann: "Security for the world had to be based on American power, exercised through an international system." For the economic and social areas, a number of institutions were established, including the following:

- The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- UN Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948

All those new organisations developed a number of activities and organised international conferences on all levels, such as:

- World Conference “Education for all” (Jomtien 1990)
- World Population Conference (Cairo 1994)
- World Conference for Social Development (Copenhagen 1995)
- UN Habitat II Conference (Istanbul 1996)
- World Food Summit (Rome 1996)
- Millennium Summit (New York 2000)
- Conference on Development Financing (Monterrey 2002)
- Conferences concerning the Protection of the Environment (Rio-Kyoto-Johannesburg)

One could discuss at length what these conferences actually achieved. One thing can be said for sure: for many people who were informed about these conferences, from Latin America to Africa, and from Asia to the Pacific, one idea took hold – people were encouraged to be aware of what they are entitled to. People considered the international community to be responsible for their wellbeing and their fate.

A great number of **new players** support that drive for new goals in foreign policy. There are countless NGOs promoting human rights issues, development aid, or the protection of the environment. Additionally, the media, quite often acting in conjunction with those NGOs and the transnational companies, set their own agenda.

In the same way, regional and municipal authorities, traditionally concentrated on internal affairs, now form trans-border coalitions in order to promote their policies.

What has been achieved? The promotion of the well-being of the people has become an important part of international relations, equal to the questions of peace and security. The people’s awareness of what they are entitled to is prevalent and affects the internal situation of states and also the international cooperation. People all over the world expect help from the government and from the international community. Governments and international organisations are judged according to the contribution they can make to achieve those goals.

Issues which in former times were exclusively an internal affair of a country have now become part of transnational discussions and international operations.

The Human Development Index and countless other statistics indicate to what extent personal wellbeing can be compared among different countries. The notion of ‘national interest’ has changed: not only are questions of power and security part of it, but also the respect for values like human rights and the prosperity of the citizens.

4.5 The impact of Globalisation

There is one decisive question concerning globalisation: who wins and who loses? Advocates, as well as opponents, of globalisation argue along the lines as to what

impact it has on the wellbeing of the people. Which countries are affected in what way, or to what extent can social justice be achieved? The basic question, who profits from globalisation, is relatively simple to answer: those who succeed in a world-wide competition, who can use global networks, who know how global mechanisms function. That can be a big pharmaceutical or a car company, or also a tennis player or a musician, a global media conglomerate or McDonalds. There are countless statistics which indicate to what extent people profit from global developments or not. Global or regional trade agreements like TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) or TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) are analysed to what extent they affect the protection of the environment, working conditions, labour standards and human rights. To quite an extent, a 'global empathy' has arisen, concerning natural catastrophes, violation of human rights or sometimes even personal casualties.

New instruments were developed to meet those challenges like the 'responsibility to protect,' 'humanitarian interventions,' or 'regime change'. Sometimes it is not that easy to distinguish between the humanitarian nature of these instruments and their power-political implementations. But the humanitarian dimension of international relations exists and is gaining momentum. Welfare-thinking has become an essential issue for the international community.

4.6 Power Politics Today

4.6.1 Power Politics continues to be relevant

There are power political contests and conflicts from the Near East to the Far East and from Central Africa to Central Asia. Sometimes it is possible to manage a crisis and on other occasions it is not. A deal was concluded with Iran; North Korea continues to build its atomic bombs. Some conflicts are frozen and others can break out again any day.

There are conflicts within the Islamic world, and there are conflicts with the Arabic world. Some even speak about a 'Clash of Civilizations.' If the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 showed what kind of threats we could face in the future, the 'war on terror' during the last 15 years, it is sad to say, can hardly be considered a success.

There are pirates, there are failed states, and there is organised crime, from drug trafficking to human trafficking. Only the trade in weapons amounted to \$100 billion in 2012.

And there is a special aspect to power politics: 'American exceptionalism.' The United States constitutes the most powerful empire the world has seen since the Romans defeated the Carthaginians in the 2nd Punic War. America, as the chosen nation, plays a special role and has a special destiny. This belief is deeply rooted in American political thinking and goes back to the founding fathers and to puritanical, Calvinistic thinking.

Already one of the first governors of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, spoke of America as "the shining city upon the hill, a model of Christian virtue, which can lead mankind

in a Christian spirit”. George W. Bush was not the first who spoke about the “axis of evil.” Three hundred and fifty years before him, in 1656, Oliver Cromwell declared the fight against the axis of evil as one of the prime objectives of English foreign policy.

Today, large parts of the US foreign policy establishment are very much convinced that the US is and ought to be the only hegemonic power in the world. Across party-lines, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright are convinced that America’s might should be the source of global security. In this sense, the US spends \$700 billion a year for defense, which is half of all the military spending in the whole world. And the US is ready to use its power. It maintains a force of 1.6 million soldiers; 500,000 of them are deployed abroad in 148 countries on 662 military bases.

Most important: the US sets the rules for itself and for others. Thereby the US attitude is basically different from what often is expected from other countries: the US insists on her sovereignty, is hardly willing to comply with decisions taken by international organisations, and its foreign policy is, if necessary, backed by the military.

In this context, one question is essential concerning international relations: should other countries like Russia, China or India be allowed to have their own national interests and their own sphere of influence? For example, the Russians concerning their ‘near abroad’ or the Chinese in the South China Sea. If those rights are denied and anyone who dares to have dissenting interests is considered on ‘aggressor,’ then the potential for new conflicts all over the world is great.

Every year, the US publishes reports which should show to what extent countries anywhere in the world live up to the rules set by America. Even if there are no immediate consequences, these reports demonstrate to what extent a government can be considered a member of the ‘international community’ or at least a potential ally. If former empires were mostly ruled by military power, the American Empire relies on rules enforced by Washington.

There are other changes concerning the exercise of power, mostly caused by the revolutions in information and education. Concerning power and security, there are essential changes in three domains:

- There are new dimensions concerning the essence of security and power;
- It has become more difficult to win wars;
- Often the theoretical concepts of peace-making do not turn into reality.

4.7 It has become more difficult to exert power

4.7.1 New dimensions of security and power

Exerting power means to force one’s will upon someone else.

After the revolutions in information and education during the last generations, which improved the knowledge especially of young people and made them quite often more defiant, it has become much more difficult to exert power.

For centuries, international security was up to 90 per cent military security, whereas today it is only based on military strength up to 10 per cent. In former times, there was one question which dominated international relations: security based on military power. Today many aspects of everyday life concern security, and also international security: from the protection of the standard of living to financial security, from health questions to the security of the environment; there are human rights and human security. All those questions can neither be solved nor decided on the battlefield; they can only be solved by cooperation.

The essence of power has changed in a similar way. Today there are a multitude of players who exert power as mentioned above: NGOs, media and transnational corporations. It has become more difficult to legitimise power. Power as well, for hundreds of years was predominantly military power. But today – beside these new players – military power comprises only up to 10 percent. In former times there was one issue dominating international relations: who was the strongest. And that issue could be decided on the battlefield. A military victory was at the same time a political victory. Today, a military victory does not mean that the will of the victor can be imposed.

In former times there was one player who exercised power: the monarch, supported by his generals and ministers. To a considerable extent the changes which took place in the international arena in recent years arose because new players have appeared. Besides the traditional actors, the nation states, new players have succeeded to use their power and their influence. They have created a new way of thinking in which existing structures cannot stand up to the new pressures that have followed.

At the same time, people have become more critical and more defiant. Therefore, it has become much more difficult to exert power. Whereas in former times it was possible to command others, nowadays it is necessary to convince them.

4.7.2 It has become more difficult to win wars

It has become much more difficult to win wars and to impose one's will upon someone else by military means. War has a physical component – to destroy – and a psychological-political component – to impose one's will. After the democratic revolutions and the information and education revolution people have become more defiant. It has become much more difficult to force one's will upon someone else. Thus, a multitude of issues in the fields of economics, environment or health cannot be solved by military means.

Today foreign policy is also guided by democratic principles. If we want to unite Europe, and if we want to improve the standard of living in the world, we have to appeal to the citizens. Today the formal legitimacy of any policy is based on elections; but the real legitimacy of foreign policy is to increase the welfare of the people by international cooperation. Today it has certainly become much more difficult to wage wars and practically impossible to solve problems by war. Wars nowadays take place in public: in front of the TV camera, observed by human rights NGOs, and they are linked to parliamentary hearings. If one can say that wars were decided up to 90 % on the battlefield in former times, today they are only decided up to 10 % on the battlefield.

Considering the multitude of issues in today's international relations it has become very difficult to formulate clear goals for any war. If we take Afghanistan as an example: the American and Allied troops were ordered not only to destroy the Taliban, but also to improve the economic and social situation in the country, to safeguard women's rights, and to set up a new system for education. How should soldiers, who are trained "to be a killing machine," as a high-ranking American general put it, achieve all those goals? After the revolution in education and information, it has become almost impossible to defeat ideas by military means.

More importantly, the home front, the environment at home, has drastically changed. There is a new concept of honour. In former times, even 10,000 casualties in one day were considered as 'great' and a great honour for the country. Today, especially in Western countries, we have developed a zero-casualties mentality. Not even professional soldiers are supposed to die on the battlefield anymore. In some countries even the word 'war' was replaced by other notions like 'no fly zone,' 'interventions,' or just that we have to 'step in.'

Under these new circumstances problems can hardly be resolved by military confrontation. Military power has been reduced to only one part of the international security structure; many non-military issues can only be solved by cooperation. Security has developed a supra-national dimension. Under those circumstances it has become very unlikely to win a conventional war.

4.7.3 How successful are humanitarian interventions?

Only a few years ago some experts were euphoric and thought humanitarian interventions under the name of 'peace-making', 'nation building' or 'regime change' could establish a new area of safeguarding human rights. In the meantime, the results achieved are rather disappointing:

- 'Peace making' was supposed to establish peaceful circumstances after internal strife or civil war. Such effects were undertaken in countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. After years of military intervention and many billions of dollars spent, Afghanistan has no functioning political system, Bosnia is politically and economically bankrupt, and refugees are still pouring out of Kosovo.
- The concept of nation building was also optimistic: historically, 'nation-building' in Europe took hundreds of years from the 'Great Migration' to the Middle Ages. Some thought that could now be done within a few years, in Iraq, Somalia, or Haiti. But reality shows that it takes more to build a nation than money and a military. And a national identity cannot be established by law.
- In the same way, 'regime change' was doomed to failure wherever it was attempted. Starting with the false conception that all the evil of a political system is concentrated in one person – in Siad Barre in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya. Instigators of regime change were convinced that overthrowing one ruler would change a country. But that did not take into account national interests, ethnic divides, or regional characteristics. In most cases, the result was not the coming of a new democracy, but turmoil and chaos.

Does it matter how we see the world, from a power-political and military viewpoint or from a perspective of welfare-thinking? This is certainly not a theoretical question and matters quite a lot. A leader who sees the world as it has been for 1,000 years will always prefer a power politics/military viewpoint. Someone who concentrates on the personal wellbeing of the people, also in international relations, will give priority to negotiations and reconciliations.

In Europe, a 'Diplomatic Revolution' has taken place. The 'Logic of War,' prevalent for more than 1,000 years, was replaced by a logic of values and property. With 7 % of the world population, the EU has become a zone of peace and consumes 50 % of the world's social expenditures. The 'old continent' has become a leader in many ways: from implementing human rights to protecting the environment and from quality of life to human security. The argument that Europe does not count anymore in international relations because its military is weak is not shared by those who find the European way of life attractive. There are certainly millions of people all over the world who want to improve their way of life and expect international relations to make contributions to achieve this objective.

5 The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe – Repercussions for Transatlantic Relations²

This chapter will provide a realistic perspective on the European integration process, including its successes and shortcomings, and the possibilities for a realistic transatlantic partnership. We often hear that Americans and Europeans share the same values like democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. This is certainly true. But the interpretation and implementation of these values in everyday political life can be different. There is certainly one big difference that must be taken into account: The Diplomatic Revolution that has taken place in Europe has not happened in the United States. Whereas the goals, the means and the legitimacy of foreign policy among European states have dramatically changed, Washington's foreign policy still relies on classical goals and instruments like *raison d'État*, *Realpolitik*, and war. These and other differences should be taken into account if we want to achieve a real transatlantic partnership. The chapter will be divided into four parts:

1. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe
2. Achievements and Crises
3. The Common Security and Defence Policy
4. Repercussions on Transatlantic Relations

5.1 The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe

During the last two generations, the legitimacy, goals, and means of diplomatic relations among European states have totally changed. These states' attitudes towards war and sovereignty have also changed, initially in Western Europe, then more lately in Eastern Europe.

Throughout history, the legitimacy of foreign policy was based on the increased power of the state and the glory of the state's respective monarch. Foreign policy was power politics. The history of diplomacy was actually the history of wars and peace negotiations, followed by other wars and peace negotiations.

However, my theory is that a revolution has taken place in this field. In the Europe of today, the legitimacy of foreign policy is no longer found in promoting the power of the state, but is found in the promotion of the people's welfare. This includes improved living standards, human rights, the promotion of commerce and culture, the creation of jobs, and the protection of the environment.

The welfare state possesses an international dimension, particularly, a European dimension. The welfare of the people, not the increase of the state's power, legitimises foreign policy in today's Europe.

The traditional goal of foreign policy – increasing the power of the state – is still taught in our schools; Metternich, Bismarck, and Kissinger are still presented as the great

² These thoughts were shared in a speech delivered at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute (DOC), Berlin, in April 2017, and the chapter has been edited by Jonathan Grayson of the DOC.

heroes of diplomacy. This corresponds to the traditional way diplomacy was conducted in the past. Indeed, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a system of states emerged in Europe where mutual relations were upheld by the principles of the sovereignty of the state and territorial integrity, and states were not subject to a superior authority. Rather, a state's national interest was the driving force of foreign policy, and diplomacy was focused on maintaining the balance of power. The soldier and the diplomat constituted a unified whole. Diplomacy reflected the 'Art of the Possible'; war was not condemned as illegitimate, and was seen as the continuation of politics, albeit by other means.

Why did all that change? After the horrible sufferings of World War I and World War II, European countries began the process of integration, based on economic cooperation and the establishment of supranational institutions. Promoting the welfare of the people became a component of foreign policy world-wide. In the framework of the United Nations, special agencies were established, like the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Food Program.

However, in Western Europe some countries went much further. With the establishment of the Council of Europe, the protection of human rights, pluralist democracy, and the rule of law became generally recognised principles monitored by international organisations, like the Council of Europe, and later, the EU. Moreover, with the foundation of the European Community for Coal and Steel, a supranational management of central parts of national economies was established to prevent future wars. The thinking behind those initiatives was that economic integration would push back national interests and promote political cooperation and integration.

The result was that in Europe we not only established a new legitimacy for foreign policy and new goals for diplomacy, but also a new means of safeguarding peace and security.

The traditional means of foreign policy were *Realpolitik*, *raison d'État* and war. This meant that a state was allowed to do anything to increase its power. Indeed, a state was entitled to practice behaviour otherwise forbidden to private individuals: to kill, to destroy, to wage war.

Contrary to those traditional means, the new means that safeguard peace and security in Europe are cooperation and integration. Today we follow a new logic: the logic of war has been replaced by the logic of values, including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

For this reason, it has become unthinkable that European countries could wage war against one another. In Europe, war is no longer considered the prolongation of politics by other means.

The logic of maintaining peace through a balance of power, established on the basis of

confrontation, has been replaced by the concept of cooperation. That's how we achieved seventy years of peace in Western Europe.

The sovereignty of the state, which used to be absolute, has been drastically diminished in many fields. The traditional way of guaranteeing peace was through respect for national sovereignty, combined with non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. This approach has totally changed. Today, peace is built on the respect of basic values like human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Further, the implementation of these values is subject to international monitoring by organisations like the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organisations have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of all member states to safeguard the implementation of the aforementioned values.

I would like to demonstrate the changes that have taken place with the use of a historical example. Rulers like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Peter the Great, and many others are considered heroic figures because they succeeded in establishing an empire, or increasing the power of their respective kingdoms no matter how many sacrifices it took, how many people lost their lives, or how many wars they had to wage. Today, such behaviour – Milosevic would be a case in point: nobody now would refer to 'Milosevic the great' – would not only *not* be considered great, it would bring the perpetrator immediately before a war crimes tribunal.

5.2 Achievements and Crises

The achievements of European integration since World War II have been remarkable. In Western Europe, almost three generations have enjoyed peace and prosperity, which had not previously occurred in 2,000 years of European history. Hereditary enemies like France and Germany for example, have become friends, and centuries of confrontation have been replaced by cooperation.

So why have difficulties like the Euro crisis and the migration crisis now emerged? The basic failure is easy to understand: European nations have given up sovereignty in several fields. Some countries gave up their national currencies; many countries gave up national border control. The problem is this: Countries gave up essential parts of their national sovereignty but no European sovereignty has been established.

When the Euro was introduced as a common currency in 1999, it brought many advantages. For example, for travellers it was no longer necessary to exchange money. Further, member states enjoyed low interest rates, so it was rather easy for countries such as Greece to accumulate enormous debts.

In addition, we adopted an optimistic language that was supposed to pave the way for a better reality. In this sense we talk about the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as the basis for the common currency, but in reality the Economic Union was never created – although a monetary union was. The question is whether it can ever enter into effect because the political and economic cultures within the Euro-zone are so different. Many examples are available: Whereas Austria cuts the number of civil servants, 60,000 new

teachers are hired in France; the retirement age is raised in Germany, but lowered in France; in times of economic crisis, the political parties in Finland competed to impose more austerity, whereas in Greece they are all opposed to an austerity policy.

All in all, one can say that the European project was too optimistic because the protagonists were convinced that the Monetary Union would lead to a political union. Certainly some common rules were established: A national budget deficit should not be higher than 3% of the GDP; the national debt should not be over 60%; in all member states, inflation should be kept low. Other rules show the unrealistic nature of the Euro project: It was stipulated, for example, that no assistance should be granted to countries in need, and states that disobeyed this stipulation should be punished. This is totally unrealistic if we only consider the billions of Euros given in subsidies to those Euro-zone members who ran into difficulties.

Considering all these developments, the fundamental difficulty is this: the basic question of whether the European Union should become a real political union or remain a confederation of nation-states remains unresolved. It is not clear how much political sovereignty EU member states want to keep and how much they want to give up. This question not only concerns currency, but also other fields. For example, should there be a European army, or should Europe rely on NATO for its defence? There is certainly a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO as far as crisis-management is concerned – the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement. But the basic question regarding the extent to which a European army should be established has not been resolved.

5.3 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The CSDP is an example that typifies the discrepancy between pretence and reality in European projects. If we talk about European defence and security policy, you might expect an army or a facility that would be able to defend Europe. That is not the case. According to the EU Treaty, military defence remains within the competence of the nation-state.

On the other hand, Europe should be active towards the outside world, spread its values, and participate in crisis management. In this sense, the CSDP is not about great armies and great wars, but about participation in conflict management. The CSDP is mostly a kind of conflict management tool: conflict management by military means, and by civilian means. But this is more wishful thinking than reality. As far as the more powerful countries have been concerned, the UK was, for example, an ally of the US in the Iraq war; and the French have pursued their own policy in Africa. Thus, this is just one example of a project that has higher aspirations than it can actually implement in reality, and it is an example of the use of optimistic notions and language not materialising in reality.

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Political and military solidarity among EU member states was also stipulated in the treaty by a mutual assistance clause and a solidarity clause.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is a doctrine that should provide a framework for its actions abroad; it was adopted in December 2003 in order to implement EU values and objectives in the field of foreign and security policy.

The ESS contains an analysis of global threats and challenges to European security, including terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts with international impacts; failing states; and organised crime.

The ESS sets three objectives for defending security and promoting values:

- Conducting a policy of conflict prevention (through civilian and military capabilities);
- Building security in the neighbourhood;
- Promoting multilateralism through international law and the United Nations.

The main activities in the framework of the ESS are the Petersberg tasks and crisis management. The Petersberg tasks focus on humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping, crisis management, and peace-making. Police activities should also help assure the rule of law in an area of crisis, strengthen civil administration, or protect civilians.

Some examples of CSDP operations are the following: Among the military operations of the European Union Force (EUFOR), Concordia can be mentioned, which was deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2003 to enforce stability for the implementation of the Ohrid agreement; the EUFOR Operation Artemis was deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its mandate was to secure refugee centres, as well as maintain the safety of the airport and that of NGOs; and the Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina was initiated in order to guarantee the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

As far as civilian cooperation is concerned, the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina of 2003 can be mentioned, as well as the police mission in the FYROM of the same year. A mission in Georgia had the goal of improving the rule of law, which was also the goal of the police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

All in all, CSDP operations are aimed at conflict management, that is, preventing crises from unfolding and stabilising post-conflict situations.

To quite an extent, the notion of a European security and defence policy is wishful thinking and does not correspond to reality. Rather, defence matters stay within the exclusive competence of member states. Actually, the more powerful countries continue to follow their own security interests: whereas the United Kingdom, for example, joined the US in the Iraq War of 2003, Germany and France were opposed. The great powers also follow their own policy concerning Moscow and Beijing; there are different approaches concerning Kosovo and a Palestinian state, and different attitudes were taken when a no-fly zone was proclaimed over Libya.

However, some European protagonists hope that in future, the notions used in the ESS

policy document, and the objectives outlined in it, could create a new state of mind, and eventually, a new reality.

5.4 Repercussions on Transatlantic Relations

The European Security Strategy (ESS) (Solana; Council of the European Union 2003), which was officially adopted in 2003, stipulates that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable: “Acting together, the EU and the United States can be a formidable force for the good in the world Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.” This is the official view, but I think a realistic view sits in contrast to this statement.

The diplomatic revolution that took place in Europe did not take place in the United States. My impression is that the differences are even deeper than that: the foreign policy establishment in Washington does not recognise the full importance of that revolution; and it does not take it into account when formulating its own foreign policy. I would like to describe the situation in regard to the following four topics:

- The different attitudes towards security and war found on either side of the Atlantic;
- American attitudes towards European unification;
- The question of whether a real transatlantic partnership is possible;
- The transatlantic partnership and relations with Russia.

5.4.1. Different Attitudes towards Security and War

There are different attitudes towards security and war, in Europe and in the US. For more than 1,000 years, nine tenths of security in international relations was made up of military security, and nine tenths of power in international relations was made up of military power. This is no longer the case. In view of the many new threats and challenges, from financial crisis to environmental dangers, and from migration to development, security challenges have changed drastically.

The same is true for the structure of international power: new players like NGOs, old and new media, as well as multinational corporations, exert tremendous power; they have overturned traditional power structures in international relations. Europeans have adapted to these new developments, perhaps because they have had no other choice. Americans, on the other hand, have stuck to traditional concepts of security and power, relying primarily on military power.

For example, before every election in Europe and in the US, there is much talk about security: but whereas discussion in the US mostly concerns military security, issues around social security dominate those discussions in Europe.

There are other differences: for most Americans, national sovereignty is of the utmost importance; foreign policy must primarily serve the national interest. In international relations, Washington follows its own rules, and sets rules for others. Joseph Nye famously wrote about ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ (2011), with the idea that an

intelligent approach towards other nations and cultures can also serve the national interest. This is certainly true. But the revolution in European diplomacy goes far beyond that: the basic goal of a European diplomat is no longer the increase of national power by any means possible, but the goal is to increase the welfare of the people.

‘American exceptionalism’, or the belief in American exceptionalism, is in my opinion the basis of American foreign policy; the belief that America is a chosen nation with a special mission in the world: the fight for good and against evil. This belief has its roots long before George W. Bush’s memorable proclamation of a fight against the axis of evil. 350 years before him, Oliver Cromwell rallied his troops against the axis of evil of his own day, i.e., the Catholic Habsburgs and the Pope. This Calvinist belief – that the ‘chosen people’ had to fight against evil – is very deeply rooted in the American concept of foreign policy, and that is one of the main reasons for this different attitude in America.

This different attitude concerning the use of military force and the readiness to fight wars has been apparent time and again in recent decades: when Ronald Reagan visited Europe in 1985, he did not succeed in persuading his European partners to participate in his Strategic Defence Initiative; the French president, François Mitterrand, said no to participation in the US research programme on space weapons. When the US went to war in Iraq, the French opposed it in the UN Security Council, and the Germans opposed it from the beginning. The German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, even turned himself into the poster boy of the opposition to the war using the slogan “power for peace” (IHT 14 May 2004).

Different attitudes towards war and the general use of force have also been apparent in relation to the Middle East. There have been similarities in terms of goals, but differences in terms of means: both the US and Europe have wanted to spread Western values and establish democratic governments in the Middle East and in North Africa; but the Europeans activated this desire by initiating the Barcelona Process, whereas the US instigated regime change by invading Iraq. Both approaches have failed.

For everyone following transatlantic relations at the beginning of the century, it became very clear that America under George W. Bush had become more individualistic, more religious, more conservative, and more patriotic than Europe. Even before the 11 September attacks, the views of the Bush administration on numerous policy issues differed significantly from those in Europe: on the Kyoto Protocol; on the International Criminal Court; on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; on the role of the United Nations, and on many other issues. Those differences have existed in the past and will continue into the future. They vary in terms of importance, but by far the most significant difference is in the attitude to war and the use of military force. This clash often culminates in the accusation that Europeans have become security free-riders, though this usually occurs without a clear definition of actual security threats.

One reason for the widening of the gap between European and American attitudes towards war was the difference in reactions to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The initial European sympathy for the American people rapidly dissipated when the Bush administration emphasised its military intentions in fighting terrorism.

Europeans had been much more used to terrorism, having dealt with it for decades, but for Americans it was a real shock. The British had coped with the Irish Republican Army for many years; the Spanish had dealt with the Basque terrorist organisation, ETA; and there had been the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. This certainly goes some way to explaining why the impact of 9/11 was so much greater on the American mentality than it was in Europe. When George W. Bush went to war in Iraq in 2003, he had the backing of a large majority, both in Congress and among the American people. On the other hand, the then German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, denounced the American anti-terror policy and warned that “the Europeans will refuse to be treated like a satellite state” (IHT 16 February 2002).

The war on terror was seen differently on either side of the Atlantic: in America, the military was mobilised to fight terrorism, whereas European countries, as they had traditionally done, relied on their police forces to fight the same enemy. When Europeans were polled on the question of which country they felt constituted a threat to peace in the world, they gave equal response rates (of 52%) for Iran, North Korea, and the United States.

I think it is the militaristic attitude of the US that has affected, and does affect, Europe. But what does this have to do with the diplomatic revolution in Europe? Europe had succeeded in replacing a logic of war with a logic of values; confrontation was replaced with cooperation; warfare was replaced with welfare. We had given up power politics in Europe. But the decisive policy that has brought power politics back to Europe has been the eastward expansion of NATO. This has expressed a willingness to seek confrontation with Russia, rather than cooperation; it has brought more instability than stability, more insecurity than security.

During the time of the Cold War, NATO defended values like liberty and personal freedom. After the Cold War, NATO expansion demonstrated a mentality that sought to continue the Cold War, and that has been a decisive factor in power politics being reintroduced.

The fundamental mistake was that after the end of the Cold War no new security structure was established – as it could have been – in Europe, which could have included Russia. Instead, Cold War structures, dominated by the West, were extended and forced upon the country that had lost. This was a fundamental mistake, and was contrary to a long standing tradition in international relations. The essence of this tradition was that after every great war or period of wars, a new security system was established.

One example was the system of the Peace of Westphalia, which took effect after the Thirty Years’ War, which placed a new emphasis on national sovereignty. There was the Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the War of the Spanish Succession and established the system of the balance of power. There was the Congress of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic Wars and established the Concert of Europe. The League of Nations was established after World War I, and the United Nations was established after World War II.

After the end of the Cold War, no new system was established; the system of the victor was imposed upon those that had lost.

Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, puts it this way in his book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the post-Cold War Era*: "Already in 1994, Boris Yeltsin warned that NATO expansion risked leading to a 'Cold Peace' in Europe". Russian goodwill and a sense of partnership towards the West was met by a hostile Western and American attitude towards Russia. "NATO expansion, decided upon by the Clinton administration, alienated Russia and turned it against a favourable post-Cold War settlement NATO expansion became one of the greatest blunders in the history of American foreign policy. . . . NATO expansion taught Russians two things: American promises were not to be trusted; and, the West would take advantage of a weak Russia". Mandelbaum concludes, "the responsibility for the deterioration of Russia's relations with the US and with the West rests with Clinton. The American insistence on the eastward expansion of NATO turned the Russian political elite against the US, and made the Russian people receptive to an anti-American foreign policy (2016)."

Today, we can therefore say that when we compare the different attitudes towards security and power on either side of the Atlantic, the American attitude has prevailed in Europe, with the results that we see before us today.

5.4.2 The American Attitude towards European Unification

Over the two generations since World War II, during which the project of European unification took place, the European project was shaped in different ways by different personalities at different times. But one could certainly say the following: the US supported the European unification project where they were convinced that a more united Europe would fit into a transatlantic partnership, and would be dominated by themselves.

Washington has always been determined to retain political, economic, and most of all, security leadership within a transatlantic partnership.

In the years after World War II, the US was certainly interested in dealing with Western European countries that cooperated and coordinated certain basic policies, and with this in mind, the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was founded in order to coordinate and distribute the aid that was provided by the Marshall Plan.

Since then, the following principles have shaped US policies towards Europe:

- European countries should coordinate their policies; but the predominance of American leadership in the transatlantic sphere should never be contested;
- Particularly in the field of European security, a European defence force should never be a substitute for NATO.

In terms of security policy, there is certainly a bipartisan consensus in the US against any independent European defence force. John R Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, and a Republican, called the establishment of a 'European Rapid

Deployment Force' a "a reckless act against the existence of NATO".

Similarly, James Woolsey, a former CIA director, and a Democrat, compared the whole situation to a scene from a Wild West movie (IPS; 2002, May 24): America is the lonely sheriff responsible for law and order, while the Europeans allow the bandits to take over. By this he meant that European countries should spend more on defence, so long as this was in support of the US and of NATO.

Many in the American media, including many intellectuals, are quite critical of the various European projects such as the Euro. As far back as 2010, Roger Cohen, the famous editor of the New York Times, compared the European currency with the League of Nations, writing in the International Herald Tribune (30 November 2010), "The Euro has no clothes".

And Paul Krugman, in the same IHT edition, also criticised the Euro under the title "The Spanish Prisoner", saying that under the constraints of the common currency, Spain has no chance of overcoming the economic crisis. Krugman continues to criticise the Euro and the European project on an almost daily basis.

Many Americans already consider the Euro successful for the fact that it still exists. They are convinced that the structured reforms necessary to overcome the Euro crisis, stimulate the economy, and improve the banking system, have not been implemented. Articles in leading newspapers maintain that a common currency without a common economic policy can hardly be sustained. Such voices can hardly be considered Euro-sceptic because that is the reality.

Scepticism concerning certain European projects is undergirded by the impression that Europe as a continent is in decay. In this sense, the conservative commentator Nile Gardiner compares the state of personal freedom, amidst a market economy, alongside a responsible government, that exists in the US, to the European Union, which according to him, is lacking those specific aspects.

During the presidential campaign of 2012, the Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, accused his Democratic rival Barack Obama of wanting to install a failed European Welfare State in America. Walter Russell Mead even asked the question of whether Europe still had the will to survive.

There are certainly some dissenting opinions in the US that do express favourable views concerning Europe and its achievements, but these make up a minority. The book *The United States of Europe*, by T. R. Reid, a *Washington Post* journalist, was published with the subtitle, *The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy* (2005). And Jeremy Rifkin, in his book, *The European Dream* (2005), portrays Americans as oriented towards the past, and sees the European ideal of 'quality of life' dominating the future.

Also significant in my opinion, and this may be seen as rather surprising, is the relatively little devotion of American International Relations scholars to the process of European unification. Henry Kissinger, in his book, *Diplomacy*, makes a brilliant

analysis of British, French, and German foreign policy, but does not even mention the EU. Michael Mandelbaum, in *Mission Failure*, writes in regard to the financial crisis that the EU is not a unified state, but is an association of governments, and explains that it has thus addressed the financial crisis more slowly and less decisively than the American government. Having said that, he concentrates mainly on British, French and German policies. John J. Mearsheimer, in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), also concentrates on the UK, Germany and France, and hardly mentions the EU.

In addition to the different approaches to issues on either side of the Atlantic, European countries have also developed their own political approaches to the US. The British are traditionally close to the Americans, so much so that many speak of a ‘special relationship’. One might dare to suggest that after Brexit, the American interest in the European project will further diminish. But besides the British, views on the future make-up of the European Union-US relationship are very close: not much more than a free trade area is proposed by the British, and certainly not a European defence force independent of NATO.

On the other hand, the French consider themselves a people with a special *mission civilisatrice*, relying on an *l’exception culturelle*. Already during the Cold War, the French president Charles de Gaulle had his own Russia policy, the ‘*détente*’, and he even left the military structures of NATO; and he spoke about a “multipolar world”, which would include China and others in the international decision-making process.

It was only a logical consequence of this attitude, that after the Cold War, France did not support the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and that many French people are also very sceptical about globalisation, which they call *mondialisation*, and is often considered an instrument of American world dominance.

Germany has been considered one of the most reliable partners on the continent. But even this relationship has suffered some erosion. Whereas 72% of Germans had a positive opinion of the US in 2011, this had decreased to 58% by 2014 (Transatlantic Trends, 2014). According to the same opinion poll, 57% of all Germans favoured a foreign and security policy independent of the US. The reasons for this erosion of trust and confidence might lie in the excessive use of American military force, in disagreements over trade and the long-awaited TTIP, or even in the activities of the National Security Agency (NSA), which spied on German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

All in all, one can say that since the end of the Cold War, America and Europe no longer share precisely the same view of danger, no longer have identical interests, and no longer share the same attitude towards war and power.

Compared to other parts of the world, like China, transatlantic values are certainly very similar, but the question remains as to what extent a real transatlantic partnership is possible in the present circumstances.

5.4.3 *Is a Real Transatlantic Partnership Possible?*

There is much talk about shared transatlantic values; but are there common transatlantic

interests and common solutions? The basis for every functioning partnership is a realistic view of reality, of things as they really are, and with this in mind we must consider three basic facts.

Firstly, the diplomatic revolution has taken place in Europe but not in the US. In Europe, the logic of warfare was replaced by the logic of welfare. The US, on the other hand, still prefers a foreign policy based on military strength; the US never allows other nations to tell it when or how to go to war; the US accepts no infringement on its national sovereignty.

Secondly, differing views persist on numerous political, economic, social, and cultural issues. These differences can even be traced to distinct views on the meaning of certain words: The word 'federation', for Central Europeans for example, represents a decentralised political system with several decision-making centres. In contrast, in the US the Federal government is the central government, and more federalism stands for more centralisation. 'Liberalism' in Europe stands for freedom and free market economy, whereas in the US, a 'liberal' stands for leftist political ideas. A 'populist', when named as such by a political opponent in Europe, is one who appeals to the people, but does not have any serious solutions. In the US, on the other hand, politicians belonging to the 'People's Party' call themselves 'populists'.

There are also markedly different views on the state and the market on either side of the Atlantic. This can be seen particularly well in France, where the state is run by a bureaucratic elite which claims to have a monopoly on wisdom. But also in other European countries, people expect the state to care for them, not only in emergency cases but also in every-day life. In relation to the market, many Americans believe that the market does not need any particular authority to regulate it, because 'self-direction' will do the job better. This view is certainly not shared by a majority of Europeans. And when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, wanted more control of the markets in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the idea was met with much concern in the American media. There are differences concerning the profit motive: there is a widespread view in Europe that profit implies pain and losses for workers and consumers, a view which is certainly not shared by the majority of Americans. There is also a difference in work ethics. Americans, descendants of industrious Puritan settlers, work up to 20 days more per year than their European counterparts, certainly much more than the average French worker, who has worked in accordance with the 35-hour working week introduced in 2000.

Continuing polemics about genetically modified plants cause alarm in Europe, whereas some Americans think Europe has turned away from scientific innovation. The list of differing views could of course be continued concerning not only the environment, but also the death penalty, industrial espionage, and international treaties.

Thirdly, America is, wants to be, and will be, the undisputed leader of the transatlantic partnership. The basic source of legitimacy for this leadership, in American eyes, is not only the economic and military strength of the US, but the fact that Europe was saved by the US from totalitarian Nazism in World War II, and was protected from totalitarian Communism during the Cold War. Viewpoints can differ over the nature of the

relationship too: what Europeans may consider American dominance, Americans themselves see as a 'security guarantee'; as they see themselves bearing the defence burden of others.

These differences pre-existed the presidency of Donald Trump, and they will continue to exist long after the present generation of political leadership. The election of Donald Trump has shown the tremendous chasm between American elites and large portions of the electorate, and its consequences could entail increased political isolationism and increased economic protectionism. But that would not represent anything fundamentally new; the fundamentals have remained and will remain as they are. The question is whether or not a transatlantic partnership is possible under these circumstances.

My answer is that yes, a partnership is possible. However, what is not possible is a compromise. America will certainly never move from the principle of 'sovereignty without submission'; and Europe will stick to its welfare state model.

But a partnership is possible providing each side chooses an open and honest approach, rather than trying to force change upon the other side. A few prerequisites should include:

- An openness to dialogue;
- An allowance for mutual co-determination;
- Respect for the interests of the other side, e.g., respect for the extent to which Europe may seek cooperation with Russia.

5.4.4. The Transatlantic Partnership and Relations with Russia

Strong mutual interests exist between Europe and Russia. At the same time, powerful lobbies in Europe, as well as in the US, oppose closer cooperation with Russia. As far as the US is concerned, relations with Russia are shaped according to national interests. From the European perspective, there are important political and economic reasons for close cooperation between Europe and Russia, as well as for a security partnership. As previously stated, the diplomatic revolution in Europe began with the Council of Europe, founded in 1949, which led to the replacement of power politics with a logic of common values. Russia became a member of the Council of Europe in 1996, and signed the essential conventions associated with membership, concerning human rights, the death penalty, and the rule of law, and Russia can be judged as to what extent it lives up to these commitments.

As far as economic partnership is concerned, Russia possesses all the natural resources – oil and gas – needed by Europe; and in parallel, European countries can help Russia to modernise its economic and industrial structures. According to a study by the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, two-thirds of Russian export revenues come from oil and gas. But having said this, each side is dependent on the other:

- Europe needs Russian energy resources;
- Russia must export to Europe, because all of its transport infrastructure is oriented westwards.

In terms of a security partnership, the essential question is whether or not we face the same threats. If this is indeed the case, we would be well-advised to confront them together. In actual fact, the spectrum of common threats ranges from Islamist terror to the instabilities of failed states, from organised crime to human trafficking, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Facing these common threats, a form of common defence would be in the interests of all parties.

Accordingly, a ‘Strategic Partnership’ was concluded between the EU and Russia as far back as 2005. It covered:

- The economy;
- External security;
- Freedom and justice;
- Research and education.

But as strong as these common interests certainly are, there are also significant differences; and it is on these differences that those opposed to closer cooperation concentrate. Russia is a country with a grand and illustrious history, having developed its own specific political culture and possessing particular national interests. An essential question is to what extent this is recognised by the West.

Hilary Clinton, as Secretary of State, once said that the time of national spheres of interests is over. It is peculiar to hear a representative of the country that has declared the whole world within its sphere of influence making such a statement. A decisive point is determining by what means other states should be prevented from preserving their own interests. If that is done through ‘regime change’ or through other military means, worldwide instability will rise.

Strong lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic want to prevent cooperation between Europe and Russia. For example, Ben Carson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the Trump administration, declared on American TV, “We have to prevent the Europeans from buying Russian oil”. Indeed, Donald Trump is regularly criticised by the mainstream media when he declares a desire to naturalise relations with Russia.

It is certainly the right of the most powerful state on earth, the US, to pursue its own national interests as it sees them. But Europeans should also be ready to pursue a policy which corresponds to their own interests, including where those interests relate to Russia. With the diplomatic revolution in mind, Europe should be prepared to manage relations with Russia in its own way. Essential to this will be knowledge of common threats faced by Europe and Russia, and which actions could be taken in the common interest.

All in all, we can say that a transatlantic partnership is possible, even after the revolution in European diplomacy, but it must be seen in a realistic way; we should rely on realities and not on wishful thinking; and we must also take account of European interests.

6 The Revolution in Non-Military Affairs

Much has been written about the Revolution in Military Affairs, about the future of warfare, about new technological developments concerning the war, about new organisational concepts concerning the military, tactics and strategies. *Foreign Affairs* has devoted a cover story to “Tomorrows Military” (October 2016), “How to make America’s Military Even Better?” and “How to Preserve its Primacy?”

I do not want to comment on those theories and observations; I do not want to question the conclusions and recommendations of leading soldiers and experts.

Instead, I would like to address the ‘Revolution in NON-military affairs,’ I do not base my observations on military matters, on the new developments in armament or new strategies, but on the social, political and legal environment in which wars take place today. I base my observations on changes concerning education and information about war, as well as on changes concerning the attitude of people regarding the state and government:

- For thousands of years, war has been the central part of everyday life, and people had to accept it;
- For thousands of years, the activities of practically every state were first of all oriented towards the increase of power, mainly through war;
- For thousands of years, it was the greatest honour to go to war and to fight for one’s own country.

However, all this is changing dramatically: people have become more critical, and more defiant. Wars take place in public: people watch the enormous sacrifices caused by wars on television on a daily basis. People follow with critical interest when a country goes to war, and judge to what extent the reasons given for war correspond to reality. Parliaments and the public want to know to what extent the goals proclaimed on the occasion of the outbreak of wars are actually achieved.

With the computer, the mobile phones, and the Internet, a revolution in information and communication has taken place. Social media give everybody the opportunity to share his or her opinion with others and to defy authority. This also affects the attitudes towards military interventions and the use of force.

Another fundamental shift concerns the basic attitudes of people: in former times, for many, war was the force that gave the meaning to the lives of individuals and social groups; the greatness of the states but also that of individuals was linked to achievements in wars, and on the battlefield. It was to a large extent the development of the welfare state that has changed that attitude: today many people prefer a higher standard of living to military conquest. This view is certainly prevalent in Europe. People have developed a sense of entitlement, and making sacrifices is not part of the modern way of life for most Europeans.

In this new context, other fundamental changes have taken place as well: a military victory does not anymore equal to a political victory. Already way back in the 1950s, the Suez crisis demonstrated that a military defeat can, with the help of international

organisations and the support of public opinion, turn out to become a political victory. The revolution in information technologies and the new media have certainly intensified this tendency.

6.1 A History of Wars

All throughout history, war was an integral part of international politics, and an integral part in the daily life of people living under the conditions of insecurity. Society not only accepted to use military force, but it considered a successful military campaign to be making a man 'great.' Wars were decided on the battlefield, from Cannae to Stalingrad. The long history of mankind has essentially been a history of war and peace. Already historians of the ancient world, Thucydides, Sallust, Julius Caesar or Flavius Josephus described the strategic goals of conquerors, the fighting spirit of the armies, strategies and tactics, and military techniques. Herodotus, Titus Livy, Xenophon and Polybius have shown us how confrontations and wars can be described from a personal perspective.

We know about the Battle of Cannae, which took place in 216 BC during the second Punic wars, and how influential was back then the 'asymmetric battle order,' which much later on influenced the Prussian king Frederic II as well as the 'Schlieffen Plan.' In recent years, new notions and new ways of analysing national and international conflicts, new techniques and new strategies have appeared: now we talk about serialisation of war, cyber-war and cyber-attacks, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid wars. We read about financial wars, trade wars or media wars. Depending on political priorities, governments wage wars on terror, on drugs or on poverty.

In a similar way, statesmen and philosophers have thought and written about peace and the possibility of peaceful relations among the peoples. Already Cicero has argued that peaceful solutions of conflicts are preferable to a forceful confrontation. The New Testament sees Christ as the 'Prince of Peace,' and denounces war and the use of force. St. Paul in his 'Letter to the Romans' stipulates the submission to governing authorities: "for there is no authority except that which God has established." St. Augustin further developed the teaching about the "just war," which has influenced Western thinking about wars to the present day.

The Imperial order of 1495, concerning public peace, which prohibited private warfare allowed in the feudal society can serve as an example that changes in human behaviour are possible, even if assiduous efforts are required. It took a long time until a new thinking concerning the legality of war and the possibility of international peace evolved. In the 17th century, Hugo Grotius developed his thoughts about peace among nations and the legality of wars in his fundamental work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. Later, in 1795, Immanuel Kant described his vision about "Eternal Peace."

Throughout history, it was legal and an accepted part of politics to wage war. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first steps taken in the 20th century, specifically the actions aimed at condemning or banning war were not very successful. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928) could not prevent the slaughter

of World War II, and the Charter of the United Nations, promulgated in 1945, succeeded only in a very limited way to regulate the use of force. Nonetheless, an age-old thinking was overturned: wars were declared illegal, and the use of force now was only considered to be legal under certain conditions. If the essence of international order consists in what is decided about the conditions for war and peace, and who decides these conditions, a new international order has evolved after 1945.

If war means to impose one's will upon someone else by force, this has also become much more difficult to achieve after the revolution in education and information technologies. People have become much more defiant, and, as destruction caused by war has become more visible, citizens make their own governments more accountable concerning the matters of war and peace. All in all, the following fundamental changes have taken place:

- Waging war is not anymore the prolongation of politics by other means, but became, to a large extent, illegal.
- It became much more difficult to impose one's will by force.
- The whole concept of honour has totally changed.

6.2 Wars were an integral part of international relations and everyday life – not anymore

Throughout history, society accepted wars as a normal activity, and wars took place rather frequently. During some centuries, like the 17th and 18th, there were hardly any years of peace. Waging war was legal, wars were considered "the continuation of politics by other means." They were waged in honour of the monarch, who himself ruled by the grace of God. Later on, after the French Revolution, the monarch was replaced by the 'national interest,' but the wars did not lose their intensity. The soldier and the diplomat both followed the same logic: years of war were followed by a peace conference, if it did not settle the affairs, new wars were started in order to achieve a new balance of power.

Today, wars are not anymore considered "the continuation of politics by other means," but a failure of politics. Today, there are many international treaties and agreements banning wars and speaking out against the use of force, like the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), the Charter of the United Nations or the Helsinki Final Act (1975). There are many human rights conventions and treaties, human rights NGOs, and in some cases special war crime tribunals, whose purpose it is to reduce the use of force and to punish military action according to new international humanitarian laws.

6.3 It was accepted to use military power – not anymore

Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian thinker on strategic affairs, defined war the following way: "Waging war means to impose one's will upon someone else by military force." That certainly meant to destroy and to kill, to violate values otherwise recognised under normal circumstances. The largest part of the population, throughout

the centuries, was uneducated and was obliged to accept the will of the authorities without questioning the consequences. In the name of *Staatsraison* and *Realpolitik*, wars could be started and even peace treaties implemented without the consent of the people affected. After the revolution in education and information, it has become much harder “to impose one’s will by force.” Welfare became for many people more important than warfare; the personal well-being more important than the dying on the “field of honour.”

Today, wars take place in public, in front of TV cameras, observed by numerous human rights NGOs, and in addition accompanied by parliamentary hearings. In former times, the military force could be fully deployed, to the extent that 90% of all wars were decided on the battlefield. Today, the use of force is restricted, as the general public is watching, the media, human rights organisations and sometimes international organisations, like the United Nations, interfere as well. For this and other reasons, the use of force is restricted to such a degree that wars are only to a limited extent decided on the battlefield. A military victory is not anymore automatically a political victory.

6.4 Wars were considered something great -- not anymore

Like many generations before us, in mid-20th century we still learned at school that *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* – “it is sweet and proper to die for one's country.” War was something great in history, it was sweet and right to die for the country. It was a great honour to die on the battlefield, the honour of the nation rested upon the shoulders of their soldiers. Throughout history, states were formed and obtained their status on the battlefields: the Austro-Hungarian monarchy gained its status as a great power fighting the Turks. Great Britain became a world power after the War of the Spanish Succession. Louis XIV is still considered as France’s greatest king, as his wars gave the country the geographic shape it still has today. Germany was unified by the wars of liberation and unification and the United States fought the war of independence.

Wars certainly influenced the arts and even romantic movements. But most of all: there was a strong conviction that wars could solve problems. And, victorious rulers and generals could decide the fate of the defeated. Many were convinced that fundamental questions had to be decided by war, as it was still the case a hundred years ago at the outbreak of World War I. Wars have always been terrible, but throughout history they were an accepted part of international relations and everyday life. Most of all, throughout all the centuries, great changes took place through wars. International relations were dominated by a logic of war. Gaining more power, also by means of war, was the main issue in international relations.

Much has changed, especially the attitudes towards war, in some places more than in others, for instance, in Austria and Germany, where the military has lost two world wars, and was accused to have fought for criminal causes. There is a new concept of honour and heroism, words today mostly used in the context of football players and ski champions. In former times, even 10,000 casualties in one single day were considered as ‘great,’ and honorable for the country. Today, in many countries, we have developed a zero-casualty mentality; and even the word ‘war’ is often replaced by other notions,

like establishing a ‘no-fly zone,’ ‘intervention’ or just that we have to ‘step in.’ Before World War II, in Austria it was unthinkable to run for public office if one was a draft-dodger. Today, in a country with a general conscription hardly anyone among the elites has gone through the military service.

There is another fundamentally different development compared to former periods: great changes take place without wars. Certainly, the American military has played a great role in developing new technologies, such as the computer, the Internet or the GPS. But, whereas for many centuries wars were the driving force for changes in international relations, that is not anymore the case today.

If we consider the great changes that have occurred during the last decades: the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the end of apartheid in South Africa. Before that the minorities like the African-Americans in the United States succeeded to emancipate themselves, and by the end of the 20th century globalisation became a driving force all over the world. Those changes were not brought about by wars, but by new ideas, new technologies, and new information systems, by the power of the braves, for whom the Polish trade union movement *Solidarność*, and Nelson Mandela are shining examples. The oral contraceptive pill anti-baby pill, mobile phones, computers and the Internet demonstrate the power of new technologies. The power of new ideas became evident in the 1968 movement, by the influence of human rights or, on the other side, by the awakening of Islamic movements.

In a complex world, there are many issues which cannot be solved by force. As long as the main question in international relations was, which ruler and which country would be the most powerful, the decision could be sought on the battlefield. But today, when every issue that plays a role in internal politics also has an international dimension – from economic growth to full employment, from the environment to human rights, from social questions to education – war is hardly a solution any more.

6.5 It has become more difficult to fight terrorism

The revolution in non-military affairs concerns different kinds of warfare, but not to the same extent. As far as the fight against terrorism is concerned, the effect is even the opposite compared to traditional forms of confrontation: someone who is convinced to find heavenly rewards for his bloody engagements is much more willing to risk his life, and does not primarily consider material personal welfare the highest goal to achieve. In the same way, the enormous media coverage of terrorist attacks supports basic intentions of terrorists: to make their destructive deeds known all over and to threaten people as much as possible. And if the respect of human rights makes it more difficult to fight terrorism, terrorists themselves are not bound by any laws or regulations. If the revolution in non-military affairs has made it more difficult to win wars, the fight against terrorism, on the other hand, has been rendered more difficult by the very same developments.

6.6 How is War Seen in Today's World?

6.6.1 The European View

In Europe we had a “revolution in international affairs,” which started with the Council of Europe, founded after World War II in 1949. Europe became a zone of peace. What was the essence of this revolution? Foreign policy in Europe was based on a new legitimacy, followed new goals that were pursued by new means. A new way of thinking concerning **sovereignty**, and international affairs originated.

During the last two generations, essence and form of interstate relations in Europe changed more than in the previous 1,000 years. The legitimacy of foreign policy used to be linked with the efforts to increase the power of the state or the monarch. Foreign policy was power politics. In today's Europe the legitimacy of foreign policy of a European country is to increase the welfare of its citizens: the standard of living, the creation of new jobs, to safeguard human rights, to protect the environment, and to promote culture. The welfare state got an international dimension; and the support for the welfare state in Europe is now seen in a mixture of foreign and internal policies. Even more, human and social rights are implemented on a supra-national level.

Traditional means in foreign policy were *Realpolitik*, *raison d'État*, and war. What did that mean in practice? That meant whatever was useful for the state could be done by its ruler, even when forbidden for an individual. In the name of the state it was allowed to break treaties, to kill, to destroy. In today's Europe the basis of security is not anymore a balance of power, but the implementation of common values: democracy, human rights, the rule of law. International organisations like the EU, the Council of Europe or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have to monitor the implementation of those values. The logic of war has been replaced by the logic of values and the logic of well-being. Security in Europe is now based on cooperation. In Europe it has become unthinkable to wage war to promote national interests. If a state violates this principle, it cannot be considered European.

The traditional basis of security has changed in Europe. Traditionally, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs were considered basic principles to safeguard international security, as it was still stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Traditionally, foreign policy used to be designed to provide security for the state. Since the founding of the Council of Europe, security in Europe has changed its orientation towards the citizens. Today, the implementation of those common values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law is monitored by supranational institutions. Monitoring by international organisations essentially means that the old principle of non-interference is no longer valid. The notion of national sovereignty is still often highly praised in soap-box speeches, but has lost much of its practical meaning.

6.6.2 The American Exceptionalism

A European-style revolution in foreign policy has not taken place in the US. The goal of American foreign policy still is to secure national interests, and to increase the power of

the country. Foreign policy is backed by the military, as one scholar said: "Foreign policy without the backing of the military is like a baseball game without a baseball bat."

The eminent American scholar Joseph Nye distinguished between "hard power" and "soft power," in foreign policy, the latter constituting the intelligent use of cultural achievements and new technology to make a country more attractive. This distinction is certainly essential. But European foreign policy has gone a step further: in Europe, foreign policy is not anymore power oriented, but social welfare focused instead. The task of a diplomat in a European country is not anymore the promotion of the power of the state, but the endeavours aimed at 'connecting people.'

There are certainly also cultural differences between Europe and the US when it comes to national security. In any election campaign, in Austria as well as in the United States, one has to talk about security. But in the United States, a politician who runs for office has to talk about military security; whereas in Austria people want to be told about the improvement of social security, the health care, and their pension funds.

The United States is a land with a mission. Every US administration still insists on national sovereignty, and expresses skeptical views towards international organisations. Americans want to fight for the good and against the evil. George W. Bush was not the first who mentioned an "axis of evil" in the world. Oliver Cromwell, 350 years ago already mobilised against "an axis of evil" in his days, which, according to him, was constituted by the Pope and the Roman Catholic Habsburgs.

In this sense it is only logical that the United States tries to have dominant players, like Microsoft, Google or Facebook, in key industries and to monitor flow of information through the National Security Agency.

6.6.3 The Dialectics of Globalisation

The repercussions of globalisation concerning security and war can be seen as a dialectic process. Globalisation unites people by facilitating and expanding exchange of goods and values, but globalisation also divides. By being included into the worldwide economic systems, countries like China, India or Brazil get stronger and can therefore become more nationalistic. In this sense there are certainly contradictory repercussions concerning power politics, and there is one problem: some forces, like global markets, act worldwide and without limits, whereas political institutions basically function on a national level. However, one conclusion can be drawn by taking into account the complex structure of globalisation: war is hardly anymore a solution in a complex globalised world.

Why are so many wars and civil wars taking place in Africa and other parts of the Third World? There is certainly not one single answer to that question. But one reason is clearly this: all social, economic, political and religious conflicts we experienced in Europe since the French Revolution, many countries in the developing world are confronted with in a single generation, and the logic of war there still dominates political thinking. Less developed countries are less affected by the 'revolution in non-military affairs' than the highly industrialised world.

Radical ideologies have time and again influenced foreign policy as terrorists have been active in different places in many periods of history. But whereas conventional warfare has become more difficult, Islamic terrorism profits from the new social, cultural and technological environment: it has become easier for radicals to connect world-wide, terror attacks get global attention, and the new media makes recruitment for extremist causes easier.

6.6.4 New Dimensions of Security and Power: The Essence of Security and Power Has Changed Dramatically in Recent Decades

Traditional security used to be viewed up to 90% as military security. In the contemporary affairs the reverse is true: considering to the great challenges of human security in today's world, military security covers only 10%. The same can be said as far as power is concerned: traditionally, 90% of power exerted on an international level was military power. Today, the power of the brave, the new players, and the new dynamic forces make up 90% of the power. In this sense, 90% of the changes that took place in former times were caused by war, which is responsible of 10% of the new development in today's world. Decisive developments like globalisation, the rise of China, the implosion of the Soviet Union or the unification of Germany took place without war. In former times, wars were decided 90% on the battlefield, today that ration would be 10%, which makes it practically impossible to win wars anymore. On the other hand, in the highly connected world, people today are affected up to 90% by the international development, what was not the case in former centuries.

Traditionally, foreign policy has been orientated towards the security of the state, provided by a strong army. Today, foreign policy is, to a very large extent, oriented towards human security, towards the security of the individual citizen. In the 21th century, threats to international security are up to 90% non-military threats. An essential goal of foreign policy has become to guarantee the basic necessities of human life. Many international organisations, countless NGOs, and governments are actively promoting human security. They fight against hunger and disease, initiatives in favour of development, human rights, and a decent standard of living have become an essential part of every foreign policy agenda. Where the basic requirements for human security are not met, from Ukraine to Venezuela and from the Central African Republic to Thailand, peace and security are in danger, but military intervention is hardly an answer anymore.

The United Nations and many of their agencies like UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNESCO, to name only a few, want to create security through cooperation. To safeguard human security and to promote human rights has become a basic legitimacy of foreign policy. In former times, international relations were mostly about one single issue: military security, hard power, and war. Today countless issues are an essential part of international conferences and international activities. Today there are many dimensions to international security: there is an economic and financial dimension, there is the important role of energy and the environment, there are human rights and education. Most importantly, those new dimensions of human security do not anymore rely on the strength of the military.

In former times, the essence of power was viewed as based on the grace of God or on military power. Today, power should be based on democratic legitimacy. In practice, the legitimacy of a government is linked to its possibility to increase the well-being of the people. For many people it has become more important to increase their standard of living than to increase the military power of their country in order to dominate others.

To demonstrate what fundamental changes have taken place, consider the word ‘great’ we use for powerful personalities in history. Alexander the Great as well as Peter the Great or Catherine the Great are considered ‘Great,’ because they succeeded to increase power of their respective countries, by conquering and destroying others. Any ruler who would act in similar ways today would not be considered as ‘Great,’ instead, the international community would demand that they are brought before the International Criminal Court. In former times, a ruler was powerful if he succeeded to enforce his will upon his subjects. Today, an elected official can exert power if he can attract and convince others. In former times, conquering a country was a legitimate act. Anyone who wants to conquer foreign territory today faces international sanctions, like Saddam Hussein, what he suffered after invading Kuwait in 1990. In former times the state had monopoly on using force. This monopoly has been broken by countless new institutions like the media, NGOs or international corporations. Those new institutions can not only exert power, but also oppose the power of the state.

6.7 What does all this mean in the context of the “Revolution in non-military affairs?”

- Will there be no more wars? The abolition of war is not to be expected, as new studies have only recently shown that human aggression is deeply rooted in human nature.
- Will there be no more international conflicts solved by military means? Probably, but only some.
- Can wars still be won? Yes, but because of the new social, political and cultural environment, it has become more difficult.

There are different schools of thought concerning the question to what extent aggressiveness is rooted in human nature. Thomas Hobbes had the strong belief that man was aggressive (*homo homini lupus est*), and would always stay that way. The French political thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, underlined the benevolent nature of the primitive being. More recently, in September 2016, the Spanish professor José María Gómez published a study, according to which aggressiveness is deeply rooted in human nature. This theory does not necessarily contradict the ideas put forward by Steven Pinker, who in his bestseller *The Better Angels of Our Nature* tries to answer the question why violence has declined in human societies. Apparently, men can be aggressive and try at the same time to tame their aggressiveness. A similar view is expressed by Jeremy Rifkin in his book *The Empathic Society*. Whatever theory may eventually prevail, one thing is certain: the revolution in non-military affairs has taken place.

6.8 Is it still possible to win wars?

After all those changes that have taken place, after the revolution in non-military affairs, the decisive question is if it is still possible to win wars.

On a daily basis we are informed about wars taking place from Central Africa to Central Asia; about attitudes of power politics from the Near East to the Far East; about power struggles in the Ukraine, Thailand or Venezuela.

The question is to what extent not only the essence of war has changed in recent years, but also the political, social and psychological environment that greatly influences the impact and the outcome of wars.

The basic question is: can wars still be won? Can wars still achieve the results the warring parties wanted to achieve? After the revolution in information and education; after the spread of democracy, people have become more defiant. The revolutions in information and education made it much more difficult to impose one's will by force.

We all remember the declaration of George W. Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln "Mission accomplished". Two years earlier, the Taliban were overthrown within weeks and the Kosovo became independent after a NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. But taking a closer look, the situation is much more complicated: the future of Afghanistan is still not clear after many years of warfare; people still get killed in Iraq almost on a daily basis; the Kosovo has become a centre of organised crime; and Libya got more and more anarchic after the overthrow of Gaddafi.

The revolutions in information and education as well as the spread of democracy have shaped a new environment for all social activities, also for starting wars and ending them.

People, especially in democratic countries, do not accept any more that soldiers destroy and kill, even if it is officially done for the good of the country. Today people can watch on television or follow on social media the destruction caused by modern weapons and they have become highly suspicious of whatever their government tells them.

Wars have always been terrible, but they were an accepted part of international relations. This is not the case anymore. The International Criminal Court and war tribunals have become an essential part of international law; still by far not perfect, but they already influence the thinking not only of academic discussions, but also of the people affected by warfare. The leaders and state governments in more and more countries, not only in democracies, have to take into account the wellbeing of their people. Under those circumstances, wars are counterproductive. Europe has shown the world that it is possible to replace a logic of war by a logic of values and a logic of wellbeing. Many regions will follow.

7 From Leadership among Nations to Leadership among Peoples

7.1 What does Leadership mean?

Let us define **leadership** as the ability to motivate others – to accomplish a common goal, to overcome difficulties, to obtain support for decisions taken by a leader. As far as leadership among nations is concerned a country could be considered leader if one succeeds to motivate others to follow him in order to accomplish a certain policy. A leader can be a leading nation or a leading personality. There also could be leadership by motivation or by force.

I would like to discuss three topics:

- A traditional understanding of leadership among nations;
- How leadership among states has become leadership among people;
- Who could be the leaders of the future.

A **traditional understanding of leadership** among nations encompasses, first of all, agencies of traditional legitimacy. For thousands of years, foreign policy was equated with power politics. The legitimacy of foreign policy throughout centuries was understood as the exercise of leadership to increase power of the state, and the glory of the monarch. As foreign policy was power politics, leadership among nations reflected this concept of international relations in this way of thinking: European history was a history of leaders who succeeded in wars and victories, who knew how to lead in war and peace.

The characteristics of traditional leadership have been:

- Leadership is based on power, mostly military power;
- A country is supposed to be strong in order to survive;
- A leader is allowed to use force to strengthen the leadership position;
- People are not consulted if they accept leaders or not;
- The essence of leadership among nations corresponds to the essence of foreign policy, as far as the goal and the means of foreign policy are concerned: power.

The **traditional goals** of foreign policy deal with the strengthening of sovereignty and power of the state. Foreign relations were seen as a struggle for existence. ‘Great’ were those leaders, who knew how to use military power, who knew how to conquer, who succeeded to increase the size and power of their territory. These were the qualities demonstrated by the great leaders in history from Alexander the Great to Peter the Great, from Charles the Great to Catherine the Great. Traditional leadership pursued traditional goals.

Traditional means of foreign policy have been *Realpolitik*, *raison d’État*, and war. War was normally considered a continuation of foreign policy by other means. Therefore, a leader was allowed to do whatever he considered useful for the state. He could conquer, kill, and destroy. The objectives of international leadership had primarily states in consideration, not the citizens.

The soldier and the diplomat formed a unity in order to support this kind of leadership. During the last three hundred years, this unity was demonstrated in war and peace, on the battlefield and during peace conferences. Since the Westphalian peace agreements of 1648, seven global wars were waged over the question who would lead the international community, and these wars had either the character of dynastic wars, wars among nations or wars over ideologies.

The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714, was between Austria and France over the question who would rule Spain. The British exploited this confusion on the Continent, supported a balance of power in Europe, and managed to establish predominance on the sea. After the Great Nordic War, 1700-1721, Russia replaced Sweden as the leading power – Peter the Great of Russia managed to defeat the forces of Charles XII of Sweden and opened his country's access to Europe. At the same time, France lost its influence in northeastern Europe. The Seven Years' War, 1756-1763, helped Prussia to become the leading European nation. Great Britain obtained the sole leadership in North America and a dominant position there by defeating France in the war over Quebec and Eastern Canada.

After the Napoleonic Wars, in the opening decades of the 19th century, the Holy Alliance of big European powers, who constituted the core of the Concert of Europe, succeeded to lead Europe and most of the rest of the world for 100 years. After World War I, 1914-1918, the League of Nations was created to test a new concept of leadership in international relations, based on collective security. This new model had some limited success, but it ultimately failed by its inability to avert another world war. After World War II, 1939-1945, two leading powers emerged: the USA and the USSR. With the institutions of the new **United Nations** and international organisations, the victorious powers and their allies tried to establish a new world order. The resulting struggle for leadership between these superpowers triggered a global Cold War, and a strategic arms race unprecedented in history.

There are a couple of common characteristics for all these wars: they were all decided on the battlefield, and dominant sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, were always among the beneficiaries.

7.2 New attitudes in International Relations

The Cold War was not only characterised by a fierce ideological struggle and an arms race, but also by a fierce competition to persuade the people of the world to **choose the way of life** favoured by the superpowers. In those days, I travelled a lot throughout the communist Eastern European countries, and I could easily discern one thing: people in those countries were fascinated by various visible things western: blue jeans, popular music, literature and the Western way of life. This attraction to the Western lifestyle created a clear impression, where the true sympathies of Eastern Europeans were.

Traditional leadership was based on power, and power was mostly equated with military power. Traditional goals of international leadership were to win wars and succeed in peace. The traditional players in international politics were monarchs supported by their generals and ministers. This set-up continued to after World War II, but people also

started thinking about taking into account not only power of the states, but also the well-being of the population, especially the ones in distress. Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw the dawn of the new kind of leadership coming, when he talked about the post-World War II period. He emphasised that leadership of a great power was to be based not only upon size, strength and resources, but also upon those enduring qualities of moral leadership that could arise the whole level of international relations the world over. This new concept of leadership was quite different from what Machiavelli emphasised almost 500 years prior in his book *The Prince*.

In terms of goals, means and players, **international relations changed** dramatically, and so did **leadership** concerning international affairs, and leaders had to take into account these developments. State leaders had to adapt by orienting their practice toward new goals and toward the necessities and priorities of those they wanted to lead, the people. To be sure, many aspects of traditional leadership that has roots in power politics are still required, as there are traditional inter-state conflicts in the world from the Near East to the Far East, from Central Africa to Central Asia; and there are rogue states, failed states, and emerging powers. There are also new threats from globalisation of terror to the threat of cyber war. However, even traditional leadership cannot anymore be exclusively oriented to inter-state relations. New leaders have to take into account public opinion, and new approaches are required as content and goals and means and players in international relations have changed dramatically. Leadership practices have to change as well.

7.3 New Attitudes in Europe

Since the end of World War II, a diplomatic revolution has taken place in Europe, concerning the legitimacy, the goals, and the means of interstate relations within Europe: the logic of war has been replaced by the logic of values – this is a very fundamental development. Among the European states belonging to the European Union, foreign policy is no longer oriented toward the power of the states, but toward the well-being of the people.

These changes that have taken place in Europe, and this is my theory, have also permeated other parts of the world. New foreign policy goals have been developed: according to these new goals, foreign relations, and international politics have to deal with the increase of the living standards of the people, fighting unemployment, while implementing human rights; and the same could be said concerning the promotion of trade and cultural exchanges. Also, health and education have become goals the international community is working for – all this differs quite dramatically from traditional foreign policy goals and traditional activities for statesmen.

In parallel to the new goals, there are **new means** developed to implement practical aspects. Hundreds of international organisations, from the UN and their affiliates, to countless regional organisations, exist for this purpose – UNESCO is responsible for culture and education, UNICEF for the wellbeing of children, UNDP for the economic development; there are organisations for refugees, healthcare, or preservation of the species; the Council of Europe for human rights, the Asian Bank of Development, and

so forth. Further, countless international conferences, whose aim is to promote the wellbeing of people in various countries or world regions, take place every year.

What have been the results of all these institutionalised efforts and conferences? There, indeed, may be very little in terms of concrete material results, but all over the world, when people hear and watch the reports of these conferences taking place, read stories about organisational activities by the UN and other agencies, they develop a sense of entitlement. There is an impression created that the international community owes something to the world population in need. People get convinced that international organisations must take action to improve their ways of life.

This is not a question of whether hard power or soft power is more important in international relations. My point is this: the goals of foreign policy are not anymore exclusively about obtaining more power for the state, but instead, improving the wellbeing of people, both domestically and internationally. This has become the most preeminent goal in foreign policy. New state leaders have to take this change into account.

In former times, international relations were dominated by major world powers, and the other countries did not amount to much. Today there are many power-structures, statistics and influence rankings that also take into account the activities of smaller nations. There are myriads of statistical data and indices demonstrating what governments have achieved for their people: there is, for instance a Human Development Index concerning living standards, education and life expectancy; there are data rankings concerning pollution; natural environment, economic development, sanitation, gender equality, wildlife protection, nutrition, foreign aid, ethnic minorities, sexual orientation, etc. There are many human rights reports; there are Transparency International and Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and so forth.

There are many thousands of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in all those fields now covered by the international community, especially concerning human rights, the environment, and development. All this clearly demonstrates one thing: there is a new dimension of activities in international relations, and the new foreign policy leadership has to be aware of that. Leadership among nations has been dominated by the question of war and peace for centuries. This is still a decisive challenge, but at the same time, international relations these days are more about serving the people, improving their living standards, helping them to lead a decent and dignified life.

In this sense, the question of leadership among nations has become a question of leadership among peoples of the world. Future leaders will be measured based on what they have accomplished in that regard. Democratic revolutions have taken place in many parts of the world. In more countries around the world, democracy has enabled people to elect their leaders and to hold them accountable. Now, even autocrats have to take into account the will of the people.

7.4 Special Developments

There are special developments leaders must be concerned about:

- Democratic revolutions and the information revolution;
- Globalisation;
- Difficulties concerning the use of force.

Democratic revolutions, revolutions in the field of **education** and **information** have changed the essence of power. This does not mean that the whole world has become democratic or everyone is connected to information highways. But people all over the world nowadays know more about their rights – they have developed more demands and they have become more critical and defiant towards authorities, more defiant to oppression and exploitation.

Whereas in former times, the great majority of the world population was illiterate, today more and more young people graduate from schools and colleges. These young people have access to new technologies, to new social media platforms, they can form new networks in order to exercise new forms of power. Democracy, which was originally and primarily developed within the nation states, has now been extended to international affairs. Decision-making in international relations has to take into account the will of the people, their desires and aspirations.

Globalisation as well affects leadership in a dramatic way. Globalisation has unleashed forces that are often very difficult to control. For instance, financial markets seem to be more powerful than political institutions. Globalisation of radical ideas has become easier through new social media platforms. Political institutions and state leaders continue to act primarily within the nation states, but worldwide challenges like a global financial crisis or global environmental problems must be met at the international level. There is a clear conundrum here: the nation state cannot solve global problems, and the world state does not exist, and that represents a very special challenge for all international leaders.

Further, it has become in many ways illegal to wage war, more **difficult to win wars** and to use force to secure international leadership. To wage a war means to enforce one's will upon someone else by military means. This, as a policy choice, has become much more difficult than it was in former times. It is very difficult if not impossible to destroy and to kill and to use force in front of TV cameras. Casualties are no longer accepted by people the way they used to. And the whole traditional concept of honour, which used to be common since ancient times, has changed and no longer could carry the day in many countries. Besides, there are many difficult international problems that cannot any longer be decided on the battlefield: the financial crisis or questions concerning economic development or dire poverty. It used to be that a military victory would guarantee a political solution for an international problem. Today, a military victory that is not accepted by a majority of the people becomes instead the originator for further violence, chaos, and turmoil. Leaders have to be aware of that.

At the same time we have seen much resources and energy wasted in state-building, nation-building or peace-building, but these huge expenses do not produce quick results. Every time human psychology is involved, a change of attitudes can hardly be achieved in a short period, neither by pressure nor by incentives.

So **leadership** within international community **has become more complex**. Traditionally, managing war and peace used to be the main task for leaders throughout centuries. There are now many new and very different challenges. Leaders have to be aware of the importance of the well-being of the people, and care about human rights. They have to know how to protect the environment and how to handle financial crises, and how to deal with the people who have become defiant.

7.5 Who will be the New Leaders?

The new leaders will be those who succeed to combine **traditional leadership** concerning war and peace with the new kind of leadership concerning the **well-being of peoples**. Leadership today is, to a very large extent, built on the power of attraction. Top universities attract students from all over the world; flourishing economies attract foreign investments; and peaceful societies can serve as a model for others.

Among the countries this is, first of all, the United States – as far as traditional leadership is concerned, the US will certainly stay the strongest country for the foreseeable future. As far as the new kind of leadership is concerned, the US has the best chances to lead the world. Why? The new issues in international relations concerning the well-being of the people, in my opinion, are nothing else but a worldwide expansion of the American dream. The American dream now has a worldwide dimension. Who should be more capable of leading in this regard than the US?

The notion of ‘American exceptionalism’ could pose certain problems: if you apply to your behaviour different norms and regulations from what you apply to the others, a problem of acceptance for such norms and regulations may well arise.

But also other countries and regions, who do not rely on traditional power, can serve as leaders: For example, the European Union or Scandinavia. In Europe we have achieved peace and high standards of living for the last two generations.

The Scandinavian countries have achieved a high quality of life and lead the world in many ways, from life expectancy to high environmental standards, and from human rights to achievements in education. This is certainly attractive for millions of people from different parts of the world. Even if there is a leadership crisis within the European Union, it stays a model for the outside world. Fundamentally, the EU is characterised by a ‘divided sovereignty’ syndrome; meaning that in terms of essential questions, like monetary policy, we have given up national sovereignty, but at the same time, have failed at creating anything resembling European sovereignty.

Emerging powers, like China, Brazil or India will very likely increase in regional influence in years to come, but I think their way of life is not that attractive as to make

people in other parts of the world consider it as a model to follow. They might increase regional attractiveness, but hardly serve as a global model.

As far as international organisations are concerned, new players like the global mass media or NGOs will certainly continue to play a leadership role in certain fields. But they will not take over global governments, and they will never become substitutes to sovereign leaders.

All in all, I dare to say, we live in interesting times: the concept of power politics has been dramatically modified, and new qualitative dimensions in international relations concerning the welfare of the world population has emerged. The future leaders have to understand the nature of new international priorities.

Curriculum Vitae

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Born 1st of August 1943 in Linz, Upper Austria

1962 Graduated from the Academic High-School Linz (core languages: Latin and Greek)

1960-1961 Exchange student at the Pacelli High-School in Austin, Minnesota

1966 Awarded Doctorate in Law at the University of Vienna

1966-1977 Postgraduate studies in political science at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Paris (Sciences Po)

After graduation from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna in 1969 entrance into the diplomatic service

Following two years of service in the Austrian Foreign Ministry (and military service) seconded to head the office of Alois Mock, then deputy leader of the Christian Democratic People's Party (ÖVP) and later serving as foreign minister

From 1977–1993: Member of the Austrian National Council. Deputy Chairman of the Audit committee; Member of the committees on constitution, internal security, science and education, foreign affairs, Austrian industries

From 1994–2000: Austrian Ambassador to Finland (with additional accreditation to Estonia)

From 2000–2003: Austrian Ambassador to Canada (with additional accreditation to Jamaica)

From 2004–2005: Head of the department for bilateral and multilateral economic relations in the Austrian Foreign Ministry

From April 2005–2008: Austrian Ambassador to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg

Since January 2009 retired

Foreign policy publications:

Finnland – Ein Volk im Wandel; Verlag Österreich 1999

Estland – Der Aufbruch nach Europa; Verlag Österreich 1999

Eine geteilte Welt – Machtpolitik und Wohlfahrtsdenken in den internationalen Beziehungen des 21. Jahrhunderts; Trauner Verlag 2003

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Published in French: « État-nation ou État mondial? »; Hirlé 2008

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