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The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe – Repercussions for Transatlantic Relations

In this article will provide a realistic perspective on the European integration process, including its successes and shortcomings, and on the possibilities for a realistic transatlantic partnership. We often hear that Americans and Europeans share the same values like democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. This is certainly true. But the interpretation and implementation of these values in everyday political life can be different. There is certainly one big difference that must be taken into account: The Diplomatic Revolution that has taken place in Europe has not happened in the United States. Whereas the goals, the means and the legitimacy of foreign policy among European states have dramatically changed, Washington's foreign policy still relies on classical goals and instruments like *raison d'Etat*, *Realpolitik*, and war. These and other differences should be taken into account if we want to achieve a real transatlantic partnership. The article will be divided into four parts:

1. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe
2. Achievements and Crises
3. The Common Security and Defence Policy
4. Repercussions on Transatlantic Relations

1. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe

During the last two generations, the legitimacy, goals, and means of diplomatic relations among European states have totally changed. These states' attitudes towards war and sovereignty have also changed, initially in Western Europe, then more lately in Eastern Europe.

Throughout the history, the legitimacy of foreign policy was based on the increased power of the state and the glory of the state's respective monarch. Foreign policy was power-politics. The history of diplomacy was

actually the history of wars and peace negotiations, followed by other wars and peace negotiations.

However, my theory is that a revolution has taken place in this field. In the Europe of today, the legitimacy of foreign policy is no longer found in promoting the power of the state, but is found in the promotion of the people's welfare. This includes improved living standards, human rights, the promotion of commerce and culture, the creation of jobs, and the protection of the environment.

The welfare state possesses an international dimension, particularly, a European dimension. The welfare of the people, not the increase of the state's power, legitimises foreign policy in today's Europe.

The traditional goal of foreign policy – increasing the power of the state – is still taught in our schools; Metternich, Bismarck, and Kissinger are still presented as the great heroes of diplomacy. This corresponds to the traditional way diplomacy was conducted in the past. Indeed, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a system of states emerged in Europe where mutual relations were upheld by the principles of the sovereignty of the state and territorial integrity, and states were not subject to a superior authority. Rather, a state's national interest was the driving force of foreign policy, and diplomacy was focused on maintaining the balance of power. The soldier and the diplomat constituted a unified whole. Diplomacy reflected the "Art of the Possible"; war was not condemned as illegitimate, and was seen as the continuation of politics, albeit by other means.

Why did all that change? After the horrible sufferings of World War One and World War Two, European countries began the process of integration, based on economic cooperation and the establishment of supranational institutions. Promoting the welfare of the people became a component of foreign policy world-wide. In the framework of the United Nations, special agencies were established, like the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations International Children's

Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Development Program, and the World Food Program.

However, in Western Europe some countries went much further. With the establishment of the Council of Europe, the protection of human rights, pluralist democracy, and the rule of law became generally recognised principles monitored by international organisations, like the Council of Europe, and later, the EU. Moreover, with the foundation of the European Community for Coal and Steel, a supranational management of central parts of national economies was established to prevent future wars. The thinking behind those initiatives was that economic integration would push back national interests and promote political cooperation and integration.

The result was that in Europe we not only established a new legitimacy for foreign policy and new goals for diplomacy, but also a new means of safeguarding peace and security.

The traditional means of foreign policy were *Realpolitik*, *raison d'Etat* and war. This meant that a state was allowed to do anything to increase its power. Indeed, a state was entitled to practice behaviour otherwise forbidden to private individuals: to kill, to destroy, to wage war.

Contrary to those traditional means, the new means that safeguard peace and security in Europe are cooperation and integration. Today we follow a new logic: the logic of war has been replaced by the logic of values, including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

For this reason, it has become unthinkable that European countries could wage war against one another. In Europe, war is no longer considered the prolongation of politics by other means.

The logic of maintaining peace through a balance of power, established on the basis of confrontation, has been replaced by the concept of

cooperation. That's how we achieved sixty years of peace in Western Europe.

The sovereignty of the state, which used to be absolute, has been drastically diminished in many fields. The traditional way of guaranteeing peace was through respect for national sovereignty, combined with non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. This approach has totally changed. Today, peace is built on the respect of basic values like human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Further, the implementation of these values is subject to international monitoring by organisations like the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organisations have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of all member states to safeguard the implementation of the aforementioned values.

I would like to demonstrate the changes that have taken place with the use of a historical example. Rulers like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Peter the Great, and many others are considered heroic figures because they succeeded in establishing an empire, or increasing the power of their respective kingdoms no matter how many sacrifices it took, how many people lost their lives, or how many wars they had to wage. Today, such behaviour – Milosevic would be a case in point: nobody now would refer to 'Milosevic the great' – would not only *not* be considered great, it would bring the perpetrator immediately before a war crimes tribunal.

2. Achievements and Crises

The achievements of European integration since World War Two have been remarkable. In Western Europe, almost three generations have enjoyed peace and prosperity, which had not previously occurred in 2,000 years of European history. Hereditary enemies like France and Germany for example, have become friends, and centuries of confrontation have been replaced by cooperation.

So why have difficulties like the Euro crisis and the migration crisis now emerged? The basic failure is easy to understand: European nations have given up sovereignty in several fields. Some countries gave up their national currencies; many countries gave up national border control. The problem is this: Countries gave up essential parts of their national sovereignty but no European sovereignty has been established.

When the Euro was introduced as a common currency in 1999, it brought many advantages. For example, for travellers it was no longer necessary to exchange money. Further, member states enjoyed low interest rates, so it was rather easy for countries such as Greece to accumulate enormous debts.

In addition, we adopted an optimistic language that was supposed to pave the way for a better reality. In this sense we talk about the “Economic and Monetary Union” (EMU) as the basis for the common currency, but in reality the Economic Union was never created – although a monetary union was. The question is whether it can ever enter into effect because the political and economic cultures within the Eurozone are so different. Many examples are available: Whereas Austria cuts the number of civil servants, 60,000 new teachers are hired in France; the retirement age is raised in Germany, but lowered in France; in times of economic crisis, the political parties in Finland competed to impose more austerity, whereas in Greece they are all opposed to an austerity policy.

All in all, one can say that the European project was too optimistic because the protagonists were convinced that the Monetary Union would lead to a political union. Certainly some common rules were established: A national budget deficit should not be higher than 3% of the GDP; the national debt should not over 60%; in all member states, inflation should be kept low. Other rules show the unrealistic nature of the Euro project: It was stipulated, for example, that no assistance should be granted to countries in need, and states that disobeyed this stipulation should be punished. This is totally unrealistic if we only consider the billions of Euros given in subsidies to those Euro-zone members who ran into difficulties.

Considering all these developments, the fundamental difficulty is this: the basic question of whether the European Union should become a real political union or remain a confederation of nation-states remains unresolved. It is not clear how much political sovereignty EU member states want to keep and how much they want to give up. This question not only concerns currency, but also other fields. For example, should there be a European army, or should Europe rely on NATO for its defence? There is certainly a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO as far as crisis-management is concerned – the so called Berlin-plus agreements. But the basic question regarding the extent to which a European army should be established has not been resolved.

3. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The CSDP is an example that typifies the discrepancy between pretence and reality in European projects. If we talk about European defence and security policy, you might expect there to be an army or a facility that would be able to defend Europe. That's not the case. According to the EU Treaty, military defence remains within the competence of the nation-state.

On the other hand, Europe should be active towards the outside world, spread its values, and participate in crisis management. In this sense, the CSDP is not about great armies and great wars, but about participation in conflict management. The CSDP is mostly a kind of conflict management tool: conflict management by military means, and by civilian means. But this is more wishful thinking than reality. As far as the more powerful countries have been concerned, the UK was for example, an ally of the US in the Iraq war; and the French have pursued their own policy in Africa. Thus, this is just one example of a project that has higher aspirations than it can actually implement in reality, and it is an example of the use of optimistic notions and language not materialising in reality.

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Political and military solidarity among EU

member states was also stipulated in the treaty by a mutual assistance clause and a solidarity clause.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is a doctrine that should provide a framework for its actions abroad; it was adopted in December 2003 in order to implement EU values and objectives in the field of foreign and security policy.

The ESS contains an analysis of global threats and challenges to European security, including terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts with international impacts; failing states; and organised crime.

The ESS sets three objectives for defending security and promoting values:

- Conducting a policy of conflict prevention (through civilian and military capabilities);
- Building security in the neighbourhood;
- Promoting multilateralism through international law and the United Nations.

The main activities in the framework of the ESS are the Petersburg tasks and crisis management. The Petersburg tasks focus on humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peace-making. Police activities should also help assure the rule of law in an area of crisis, strengthen civil administration, or protect civilians.

Some examples of CSDP operations are the following: Among the military operations of the European Union Force (EUFOR), Concordia can be mentioned, which was deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2003 to enforce stability for the implementation of the Ochrid agreement; the EUFOR Artemis Operation was deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its mandate was to secure refugee centres,

as well as maintain the safety of the airport and that of NGOs; and the Althea-Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was initiated in order to guarantee the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

As far as civilian cooperation is concerned, the EU police mission in Bosnia- Herzegovina of 2003 can be mentioned, as can the police mission in the FYROM of the same year. A mission in Georgia had the goal of improving the rule of law, which was also the goal of the police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

All in all, CSDP operations are aimed at conflict management, that is, preventing crises from unfolding and stabilising post-conflict situations.

To quite an extent, the notion of a European security and defence policy is wishful thinking and does not correspond to reality. Rather, defence matters stay within the exclusive competence of member states. Actually, the more powerful countries continue to follow their own security interests: whereas the United Kingdom, for example, joined the US in the Iraq War of 2003, Germany and France were opposed. The great powers also follow their own policy concerning Moscow and Beijing; there are different approaches concerning Kosovo, and a Palestinian state, and different attitudes were taken when a no-fly zone was proclaimed over Libya.

However, some European protagonists hope that in future, the notions used in the ESS policy document, and the objectives outlined in it, could create a new state of mind, and eventually, a new reality.

4. Repercussions on Transatlantic Relations

The European Security Strategy ((ESS) - Solana; Council of the European Union 2003), which was officially adopted in 2003, stipulates that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable: "Acting together, the EU and the United States can be a formidable force for the good in the world Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA." This

is the official view, but I think a realistic view sits in contrast to this statement.

The diplomatic revolution that took place in Europe did not take place in the United States. My impression is that the differences are even deeper than that: the foreign policy establishment in Washington does not recognise the full importance of that revolution; and it does not take it into account when formulating its own foreign policy. I would like to describe the situation in regard to the following four topics:

- The different attitudes towards security and war found on either side of the Atlantic;
- American attitudes towards European unification;
- The question of whether a real transatlantic partnership is possible;
- The transatlantic partnership and relations with Russia.

4.1. Different Attitudes towards Security and War

There are different attitudes towards security and war, in Europe and in the US. For more than 1,000 years, nine tenths of security in international relations was made up of military security, and nine tenths of power in international relations was made up of military power. This is no longer the case. In view of the many new threats and challenges, from financial crisis to environmental dangers, and from migration to development, security challenges have changed drastically.

The same is true for the structure of international power: new players like NGOs, old and new media, as well as multinational corporations, exert tremendous power; they have overturned traditional power structures in international relations. Europeans have adapted to these new developments, perhaps because they have had no other choice.

Americans, on the other hand, have stuck to traditional concepts of security and power, relying primarily on military power.

For example, before every election in Europe and in the US, there is much talk about security: but whereas discussion in the US mostly concerns military security, issues around social security dominate those discussions in Europe.

There are other differences: for most Americans, national sovereignty is of the utmost importance; foreign policy must primarily serve the national interest. In international relations, Washington follows its own rules, and sets rules for others. Joseph Nye famously wrote about *hard power* and *soft power* (2011), with the idea that an intelligent approach towards other nations and cultures can also serve the national interest. This is certainly true. But the revolution in European diplomacy goes far beyond that: the basic goal of a European diplomat is no longer the increase of national power by any means possible, but the goal is to increase the welfare of the people.

American exceptionalism, or the belief in American exceptionalism, is in my opinion the basis of American foreign policy; the belief that America is a chosen nation with a special mission in the world: the fight for good and against evil. This belief has its roots long before George W. Bush's memorable proclamation of a fight against the axis of evil. 350 years before him, Oliver Cromwell rallied his troops against the axis of evil of his own day, i.e., the Catholic Habsburgs and the Pope. This Calvinist belief – that the “chosen people” had to fight against evil – is very deeply rooted in the American concept of foreign policy, and that is one of the main reasons for this different attitude in America.

This different attitude concerning the use of military force and the readiness to fight wars has been apparent time and again in recent decades: when Ronald Reagan visited Europe in 1985, he did not succeed in persuading his European partners to participate in his Strategic Defence Initiative; the French president, Francois Mitterrand, said no to

participation in the US research programme on space weapons. When the US went to war in Iraq, the French opposed it in the UN Security Council, and the Germans opposed it from the beginning. The German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, even turned himself into the poster boy of the opposition to the war using the slogan “power for peace” (IHT 14 May 2004).

Different attitudes towards war and the general use of force have also been apparent in relation to the Middle East. There have been similarities in terms of goals, but differences in terms of means: both the US and Europe have wanted to spread Western values and establish democratic governments in the Middle East and in North Africa; but the Europeans activated this desire by initiating the Barcelona process, whereas the US instigated regime change by invading Iraq. Both approaches have failed.

For everyone following transatlantic relations at the beginning of the century, it became very clear that America under George W. Bush had become more individualistic, more religious, more conservative, and more patriotic than Europe. Even before the 11 September attacks, the views of the Bush administration on numerous policy issues differed significantly from those in Europe: on the Kyoto Protocol; on the International Criminal Court; on the anti-ballistic missile treaty; on the role of the United Nations, and on many other issues. Those differences have existed in the past and will continue into the future. They vary in terms of importance, but by far the most significant difference is in the attitude to war and the use of military force. This clash often culminates in the accusation that Europeans have become security free-riders, though this usually occurs without a clear definition of actual security threats.

One reason for the widening of the gap between European and American attitudes towards war was the difference in reactions to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The initial European sympathy for the American people rapidly dissipated when the Bush administration emphasised its military intentions in fighting terrorism. Europeans had been much more used to terrorism, having dealt with it for decades, but

for Americans it was a real shock. The British had coped with the Irish Republican Army for many years; the Spanish had dealt with the Basque terrorist organisation, ETA; and there had been the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. This certainly goes some way to explaining the why the impact of 9/11 was so much greater on the American mentality than it was in Europe. When George W. Bush went to war in Iraq in 2003, he had the backing of a large majority, both in Congress and among the American people. On the other hand, the then German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, denounced the American anti-terror policy and warned that “the Europeans will refuse to be treated like a satellite state (IHT 2002, February 16)”.

The war on terror was seen differently on either side of the Atlantic: in America, the military was mobilised to fight terrorism, whereas European countries, as they had traditionally done, relied on their police forces to fight the same enemy. Results when Europeans were polled on the question of which country they felt constituted a threat to peace in the world, gave equal response rates (of 52%) for Iran, North Korea, and the United States.

I think it is the militaristic attitude of the US that has affected, and does affect, Europe. But what does this have to do with the diplomatic revolution in Europe? Europe had succeeded in replacing a logic of war with a logic of values; confrontation was replaced with cooperation; warfare was replaced with welfare. We had given up power politics in Europe. But the decisive policy that has brought power politics back to Europe has been the eastward expansion of NATO. This has expressed a willingness to seek confrontation with Russia, rather than cooperation; it has brought more instability than stability, more insecurity than security.

During the time of the Cold War, NATO defended values like liberty and personal freedom. After the Cold War, NATO expansion demonstrated a mentality that sought to continue the Cold War, and that has been a decisive factor in power politics being reintroduced.

The fundamental mistake was that after the end of the Cold War, no new security structure was established – as it could have been – in Europe, which could have included Russia. Instead, Cold War structures, dominated by the West, were extended and forced upon the country that had lost. This was a fundamental mistake, and was contrary to a long standing tradition in international relations. The essence of this tradition was that after every great war or period of wars, a new security system was established.

One example was the system of the Peace of Westphalia, which took effect after the Thirty Years' War, which placed a new emphasis on national sovereignty; There was the Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the War of the Spanish Succession and established the system of the balance of power; There was the Congress of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic Wars and established the Concert of Europe; The League of Nations was established after World War One, and the United Nations was established after World War Two.

After the end of the Cold War, no new system was established; the system of the victor was imposed upon those that had lost.

Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at the John Hopkins University of Advanced International Studies, puts it this way in his book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the post-Cold War Era*: “Already in 1994, Boris Yeltsin warned that NATO expansion risked leading to a ‘Cold Peace’ in Europe”. Russian goodwill and a sense of partnership towards the West was met by a hostile Western and American attitude towards Russia. “NATO expansion, decided upon by the Clinton administration, alienated Russia and turned it against a favourable post-Cold War settlement NATO expansion became one of the greatest blunders in the history of American foreign policy. ... NATO expansion taught Russians two things: American promises were not to be trusted; and, the West would take advantage of a weak Russia”. Mandelbaum concludes, “the responsibility for the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the US and with the West rests with Clinton. The American insistence

on the eastward expansion of NATO turned the Russian political elite against the US, and made the Russian people receptive to an anti-American foreign policy (2016).”

Today, we can therefore say that when we compare the different attitudes towards security and power on either side of the Atlantic, the American attitude has prevailed in Europe, with the results that we see before us today.

4.2 The American Attitude towards European Unification

Over the two generations since World War Two, during which the project of European unification took place, the European project was shaped in different ways by different personalities at different times. But one could certainly say the following: the US supported the European unification project where they were convinced that a more united Europe would fit into a transatlantic partnership, and would be dominated by themselves.

Washington has always been determined to retain political, economic, and most of all, security leadership within a transatlantic partnership.

In the years after World War Two, the US was certainly interested in dealing with Western European countries that cooperated and coordinated certain basic policies, and with this in mind, the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was founded in order to coordinate and distribute that aid that was provided by the Marshall Plan.

Since then, the following principles have shaped US policies towards Europe:

- European countries should coordinate their policies; but the predominance of American leadership in the transatlantic sphere should never be contested;

- Particularly in the field of European security, a European defence force should never be a substitute for NATO;

In terms of security policy, there is certainly a bipartisan consensus in the US against any independent European defence force. John R Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, and a Republican, called the establishment of a “European Rapid Deployment Force” a “a reckless act against the existence of NATO”.

Similarly, James Woolsey, a former CIA director, and a Democrat, compared the whole situation to a scene from a wild west movie (IPS; 2002, May 24): America is the lonely sheriff responsible for law and order, while the Europeans allow the bandits to take over. By this he meant that European countries should spend more on defence, so long as this was in support of the US and of NATO.

Many in the American media, including many intellectuals, are quite critical of the various European projects such as the Euro. As far back as 2010, Roger Cohen, the famous editor of the New York Times, compared the European currency with the League of Nations, writing in the International Herald Tribune (2010, November 30), “The Euro has no clothes”.

And Paul Krugman, in the same IHT edition, also criticised the Euro under the title “The Spanish Prisoner”, saying that under the constraints of the common currency, Spain has no chance of overcoming the economic crisis. Krugman continues to criticise the Euro and the European project on an almost daily basis.

Many Americans already consider the Euro successful for the fact that it still exists. They are convinced that the structured reforms necessary to overcome the Euro crisis, stimulate the economy, and improve the banking system, have not been implemented. Articles in leading newspapers maintain that a common currency without a common

economic policy can hardly be sustained. Such voices can hardly be considered Euro-sceptic because that is the reality.

Scepticism concerning certain European projects is undergirded by the impression that Europe as a continent is in decay. In this sense, the conservative commentator Nile Gardiner compares the state of personal freedom, amidst a market economy, alongside a responsible government, that exists in the US, to the European Union, which according to him, is lacking those specific aspects.

During the presidential campaign of 2012, the Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, accused his Democratic rival Barack Obama of wanting to install a failed European Welfare State in America. Walter Russell Mead even asked the question of whether Europe still had the will to survive.

There are certainly some dissenting opinions in the US that do express favourable views concerning Europe and its achievements, but these make up a minority. The book *The United States of Europe*, by T. R. Reid, a *Washington Post* journalist, was published with the subtitle, *The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy* (2005). And Jeremy Rifkin, in his book, *The European Dream* (2005), portrays Americans as oriented towards the past, and sees the European ideal of *quality of life* dominating the future.

Also significant in my opinion, and this may be seen as rather surprising, is the relatively little devotion of American International Relations scholars to the process of European unification. Henry Kissinger, in his book, *Diplomacy*, makes a brilliant analysis of British, French, and German foreign policy, but does not even mention the EU. Michael Mendalbaum, in *Mission Failure*, writes in regard to the financial crisis that the EU is not a unified state, but is an association of governments, and explains that it has thus addressed the financial crisis more slowly and less decisively than the American government. Having said that, he concentrates mainly on British, French and German policies. John J. Mearsheimer, in *The*

Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), also concentrates on the UK, Germany and France, and hardly mentions the EU.

In addition to the different approaches to issues on either side of the Atlantic, European countries have also developed their own political approaches to the US. The British are traditionally close to the Americans, so much so that many speak of a *special relationship*. One might dare to suggest that after Brexit, the American interest in the European project will further diminish. But besides the British, views on the future make-up of the European Union-US relationship are very close: not much more than a free trade area is proposed by the British, and certainly not a European defence force independent of NATO.

On the other hand, the French consider themselves a people with a special *mission civilisatrice*, relying on an *l'exception culturelle*. Already during the Cold War, the French president Charles de Gaulle had his own Russia policy, the '*détente*', and he even left the military structures of NATO; and he spoke about a "multipolar world", which would include China and others in the international decision-making process.

It was only a logical consequence of this attitude, that after the Cold War, France did not support the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and that many French people are also very sceptical about globalisation, which they call *mondialisation*, and is often considered an instrument of American world dominance.

Germany has been considered one of the most reliable partners on the continent. But even this relationship has suffered some erosion. Whereas 72% of Germans had a positive opinion of the US in 2011, this had decreased to 58% by 2014 (Transatlantic Trends, 2014). According to the same opinion poll, 57% of all Germans favoured a foreign and security policy independent of the US. The reasons for this erosion of trust and confidence might lie in the excessive use of American military force, in disagreements over trade and the long-awaited TTIP, or even in the

activities of the National Security Agency (NSA), which spied on German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

All in all, one can say that since the end of the Cold War, America and Europe no longer share precisely the same view of danger, no longer have identical interests, and no longer share the same attitude towards war and power

Compared to other parts of the world, like China, transatlantic values are certainly very similar, but the question remains as to what extent a real transatlantic partnership is possible in the present circumstances.

4.3 Is a Real Transatlantic Partnership Possible?

There is much talk about shared transatlantic values; but are there common transatlantic interests, and common solutions? The basis for every functioning partnership is a realistic view of reality, of things as they really are, and with this in mind we must consider three basic facts.

Firstly, the diplomatic revolution has taken place in Europe but not in the US. In Europe, the logic of warfare was replaced by the logic of welfare. The US, on the other hand, still prefers a foreign policy based on military strength; the US never allows other nations to tell it when or how to go to war; the US accepts no infringement on its national sovereignty.

Secondly, differing views persist on numerous political, economic, social, and cultural issues. These differences can even be traced to distinct views on the meaning of certain words: The word 'federation', for central Europeans for example, represents a decentralised political system with several decision-making centres. In contrast, in the US the Federal government is the central government, and more federalism stands for more centralisation; 'Liberalism' in Europe stands for freedom and free market economy, whereas in the US, a 'liberal' stands for leftist political ideas; A 'populist', when named as such by a political opponent in Europe, is one who appeals to the people, but does not have any serious solutions. In the US, on the other hand, politicians belonging to the 'People's Party' call themselves 'populists'.

There are also markedly different views on the state and the market on either side of the Atlantic. This can be seen particularly well in France, where the state is run by a bureaucratic elite which claims to have a monopoly on wisdom. But also in other European countries, people expect the state to care for them, not only in emergency cases but also in every-

day life. In relation to the market, many Americans believe that the market does not need any particular authority to regulate it, because 'self-direction' will do the job better. This view is certainly not shared by a majority of Europeans. And when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, wanted more control of the markets in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the idea was met with much concern in the American media. There are differences concerning the profit motive: there is a widespread view in Europe that profit implies pain and losses for workers and consumers, a view which is certainly not shared by the majority of Americans. There is also a difference in work ethics. Americans, descendants of industrious Puritan settlers, work up to 20 days more per year than their European counterparts, certainly much more than the average French worker, who has worked in accordance with the 35-hour working week introduced in 2000.

Continuing polemics about genetically modified plants cause alarm in Europe, whereas some Americans think Europe has turned away from scientific innovation. The list of differing views could of course be continued concerning not only the environment, but also the death penalty, industrial espionage, and international treaties.

Thirdly, America is, wants to be, and will be, the undisputed leader of the transatlantic partnership. The basic source of legitimacy for this leadership, in American eyes, is not only the economic and military strength of the US, but the fact that Europe was saved by the US from totalitarian Nazism in World War Two, and was protected from totalitarian Communism during the Cold War. Viewpoints can differ over the nature of the relationship too: what Europeans may consider American dominance, Americans themselves see as a 'security guarantee'; as they see themselves bearing the defence burden of others.

These differences pre-existed the presidency of Donald Trump, and they will continue to exist long after the present generation of political leadership. The election of Donald Trump has shown the tremendous chasm between American elites and large portions of the electorate, and its consequences could entail increased political isolationism and increased economic protectionism. But that would not represent anything fundamentally new; the fundamentals have remained and will remain as they are. The question is whether or not a transatlantic partnership is possible under these circumstances.

My answer is that yes; a partnership is possible. However, what is not possible is a compromise. America will certainly never move from the principle of *sovereignty without submission*; and Europe will stick to its Welfare State model.

But a partnership is possible providing each side chooses an open and honest approach, rather than trying to force change upon the other side. A few prerequisites should include:

- An openness to dialogue;
- An allowance for mutual co-determination;
- Respect for the interests of the other side, e.g., respect for the extent to which Europe may seek cooperation with Russia

4.4. The Transatlantic Partnership and Relations with Russia

Strong mutual interests exist between Europe and Russia. At the same time, powerful lobbies in Europe, as well as in the US, oppose closer cooperation with Russia. As far as the US is concerned, relations with Russia are shaped according to national interests.

From the European perspective, there are important political and economic reasons for close cooperation between Europe and Russia, as well as for a security partnership. As previously stated, the diplomatic revolution in Europe began with the Council of Europe, founded in 1949, which led to the replacement of power politics with a logic of common values. Russia became a member of the Council of Europe in 1996, and signed the essential conventions associated with membership, concerning human rights, the death penalty, and the rule of law, and Russia can be judged as to what extent it lives up to these commitments.

As far as economic partnership is concerned, Russia possesses all the natural resources – oil and gas – needed by Europe; and in parallel, European countries can help Russia to modernise its economic and industrial structures. According to a study by the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, two-thirds of Russian export revenues come from oil and gas. But having said this, each side is dependent on the other:

- Europe needs Russian energy resources;
- Russia must export to Europe, because all of its transport infrastructure is oriented westwards;

In terms of a security partnership, the essential question is whether or not we face the same threats. If this is indeed the case, we would be well-advised to confront them together. In actual fact, the spectrum of common threats ranges from Islamist terror to the instabilities of failed states, from organised crime to human trafficking, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Facing these common threats, a form of common defence would be in the interests of all parties.

Accordingly, a ‘Strategic Partnership’ was concluded between the EU and Russia as far back as 2005. It covered:

- The economy;
- External security;

- Freedom and justice;
- Research and education.

But as strong as these common interests certainly are, there are also significant differences; and it is on these differences that those opposed to closer cooperation concentrate. Russia is a country with a grand and illustrious history, having developed its own specific political culture and possessing particular national interests. An essential question is to what extent this is recognised by the West.

Hilary Clinton, as Secretary of State, once said that the time of national spheres of interests is over. It is peculiar to hear a representative of the country that has declared the whole world within its sphere of influence making such a statement. A decisive point is determining by what means other states should be prevented from preserving their own interests. If that is done through 'regime change' or through other military means, worldwide instability will rise.

Strong lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic want to prevent cooperation between Europe and Russia. For example, Ben Carson, secretary for housing and urban development in the Trump administration, declared on American TV, "We have to prevent the Europeans from buying Russian oil". Indeed, Donald Trump is regularly criticised by the mainstream media when he declares a desire to naturalise relations with Russia.

It is certainly the right of the most powerful state on earth, the US, to pursue its own national interests as it sees them. But Europeans should also be ready to pursue a policy which corresponds to their own interests, including where those interests relate to Russia. With the diplomatic revolution in mind, Europe should be prepared to manage relations with Russia its own way. Essential to this will be knowledge of common threats faced by Europe and Russia, and which actions could be taken in the common interest.

All in all, we can say that a transatlantic partnership is possible, even after the revolution in European diplomacy, but it must be seen in a realistic way; we should rely on realities and not on wishful thinking; and we must also take account of European interests.

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